An insider’s account of how 3M kept its scientists in the dark about PFAS
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A new case study details evidence about how a prominent chemical manufacturer limited what company scientists researched, what they knew, and how they shared information about a dangerous and pervasive chemical, underscoring how companies use deceptive tactics to silence their own scientists.
The findings, published Tuesday in Environmental Health Perspectives, draw on former 3M scientist Kris Hansen’s first-hand accounts, as well as internal documents revealed through litigation, to identify specific strategies the company used to keep evidence of PFAS harms from being studied or even shared within the organization. Hansen co-authored the study along with two sociologists.
Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a class of chemicals that are known to persist in the environment and are linked to some cancers, high cholesterol, reproductive issues and other health problems. 3M acquired the process used to manufacture PFAS in 1945, developing several products made of PFAS, including fire suppressants and coating for food-contact materials. The company has faced a wave of litigation over the chemicals.
Hansen first made headlines in a 2024 ProPublica investigation documenting her experiences working at 3M’s Environmental Lab from 1996 to 2001.
In the late 1990s, Hansen believed her team was the first to discover that a type of PFAS called perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) was widespread in the general population, based on human blood samples. EPA and 3M announced the company would undergo a voluntary phase-out of PFOS production more than two decades ago, citing risks to human health and the environment.
Decades later, reading documents made public through litigation, Hansen learned that both 3M scientists and executives had known of widespread human exposure to 3M PFAS starting in the 1970s. Hansen essentially produced work without knowing it had already been done but suppressed.
“When I look back at my own experiences, I feel like I, as a young scientist, was naive. I trusted too much in the organization that I worked for,” Hansen said.
The journal article details how Hansen was instructed to stamp analytical reports with “Attorney Client Privilege – Do not copy/Do not disclose,” labels to prevent unwanted “discovery,” regardless of whether she had contact with attorneys.
Hansen was also told by management not to discuss or disclose data to anyone except the requester, and, on one occasion, to provide research and notes only in personally delivered, hardcopy form, not electronically.
“When I look back at my own experiences, I feel like I, as a young scientist, was naive. I trusted too much in the organization that I worked for.” – Kris Hansen, Former 3M scientist
Some managers also didn’t share key information with their own scientists, which delayed research that was “potentially damaging to the corporation,” the study noted.
For example, a manager told Hansen that an analytical tool she was pursuing for better accuracy and method sensitivity in PFOS detection was incompatible with PFOS and PFOA. However, given that the manager was a participant in a study that demonstrated the effective use of this tool years prior, the information was false.
Internal Mechanisms
The study outlines four mechanisms that the authors say can keep evidence from being produced or shared inside an organization: hierarchical control, withholding of prior findings, isolation of scientists, and intimidation of scientists.
The authors argue these strategies make the discovery of risks less likely. Further, if concerns are raised, they work to suppress the internal dissemination of information.
For example, in a 1978 memo to company executives, a 3M scientist reinstated a prior request to investigate human blood exposure from 3M products. However, the authors found no evidence that the requested research was approved or initiated prior to 1998.
In 1983, another 3M scientist pushed for laboratory- and field-based experiments to characterize the environmental fate and toxicity of 3M’s PFAS. A “Questions and Answers” document was produced months later to respond to the scientist’s questions. The answers downplayed the risks of PFAS to humans and the environment. Further, the authors of the study found no evidence that field studies associated with the proposed research were conducted as a result of the proposal.
“The answer got uncomfortable, and so the solution was to not do the study that confirmed the answer,” Hansen said.
Meanwhile, fluorochemical production at 3M increased during that period, expanding five-fold between 1975 and 1989.
Study co-author Alissa Cordner, professor of sociology at Whitman College and co-director of the PFAS Project Lab at Northeastern University, sees these as clear examples of “undone” science, which she describes as research that isn’t conducted because it would work against the interests of the groups that might be able to fund research.
“One prominent category of undone science is research on the risks that a product might pose, and it isn’t typically in the interest of, say, a manufacturer to dig into those potential risks more than they are required to by regulation, and so there’s a lot of undone science on, say, chemical risk or chemical toxicity,” said Cordner.
“They’re not only withholding the truth about their products, but they’re taking active steps to obfuscate or hide what the harms are from their products,” said Tracey Woodruff, professor of epidemiology and population health at Stanford who co-authored a 2023 study that also analyzed corporate actions to suppress research findings.
“They’re not only withholding the truth about their products, but they’re taking active steps to obfuscate or hide what the harms are from their products.” – Tracey Woodruff, Professor of epidemiology and population health at Stanford
Another corporate strategy the new case study outlined is “isolating scientists,” where sensitive information is only moved up and down chains of command, as opposed to freely between colleagues in different departments.
Woodruff said this approach can be common across the sector. The isolation of scientists, she said, prevents them from understanding their shared experience across multiple people in the organization.
“They isolate scientists or they intimidate scientists, and they do this all with the goal of making sure that the public and regulators don’t know about the health harms of their products, and that leads to a rigged system that then promotes their product for profit at the expense of people’s health,” Woodruff said.
The authors note these mechanisms are not necessarily exclusive to 3M.
“This is not just a story about one company. These are the types of organizational structures or specific organizational practices that can be used within a company or an organization or an agency to prevent or delay needed research on important topics,” said Cordner.
The study comes after 3M reached a $7.35 billion settlement over PFAS firefighting foam injury claims.
3M did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The study concludes with a call to action, which includes public access to all discovery documents in future PFAS and environmental health settlements, as well as civil and criminal accountability for companies and executives when laws are broken.
For Hansen, the work is not just about PFAS or 3M, but more broadly “how industries in America manufacture doubt throughout their organizations.”
Featured image from 3M.