1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI AT KANSAS CITY 2 3 ALLAN SHELTON, et al.,) 4 Plaintiff,)) 5 Case No. 1816-CV17026 -vs-)) 6 MONSANTO, et al.,)) 7 Defendant.) 8 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 9 On Friday, April 8, 2022, the above cause 10 came on for hearing before the Honorable Charles H. McKenzie, Judge of Division 13 of the 16th Judicial Circuit, Jackson County Court, at Kansas City, 11 Missouri: 12 13 14 **APPEARANCES:** 15 For the Plaintiffs: 16 FRAZER, PLC By: Mr. Roe Frazer, Mr. Trey Frazer and 17 Mr. Patrick McMurtray Burton Hills II 30 Burton Hills Boulevard, Suite 450 18 Nashville, Tennessee 37215 19 ONDER LAW 20 By: Mr. Wylie Blair 110 East Lockwood Avenue 21 St. Louis, Missouri 63119 22 ANDRUS WAGSTAFF By: Mr. David J. Wool 23 7171 West Alaska Drive Lakewood, Colorado 80226 24 25

1	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)
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1	THE COURT: The Court will call the case
2	of Allan Shelton and the Monsanto Company,
3	1816-CV17026. For those attorneys that are going
4	to be addressing the Court this morning, I'd ask
5	you to identify yourself, and if you'd please, if
6	you're not an attorney who has previously been
7	with us, if you'd spell your full name.
8	Otherwise, I suspect we've got all the spellings.
9	Start with plaintiffs.
10	MR. BLAIR: Wylie Blair for the
11	plaintiffs.
12	MR. ROE FRAZER: Your Honor, Roe Frazer
13	for the plaintiffs.
14	MR. WOOL: David Wool on behalf of the
15	plaintiffs.
16	MR. MCMURTRAY: Patrick McMurtray on
17	behalf of the plaintiffs.
18	THE COURT: Defense, please.
19	MS. SASTRE: Yes. Good morning, Your
20	Honor. Hildy Sastre for Monsanto.
21	MR. ADAMS: Judge, Robert Adams for
22	Monsanto.
23	MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, Jason Zager on
24	behalf of Monsanto.
25	MR. HASKEN: Your Honor, Tim Hasken on

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behalf of Monsanto.

2 THE COURT: Okay. And what I wanted to do is to give you an update on the schedule and 3 4 then, perhaps for this morning, address the 5 schedule that I want to attend to before we 6 conclude the day and then determine other issues 7 that we should address as you see fit. The first for our schedule. I am available until 11:00 this 8 9 morning, then I'll have a brief interlude. I do 10 have a sentencing hearing that is getting continued. I can go until noon with all of you 11 with that ten-minute time. You don't have to 12 13 leave, I would just need to attend to a different 14 And then we'll see what other time we have case. 15 available in the coming days prior to April 27th. 16 I have consulted with Judge Youngs. Ι 17 have been given permission to allow for jury selection in what we call Division 1. 18 Those who 19 have been in Jackson County are aware that's the 20 former courtroom for Sandy Midkiff. It is our 21 largest courtroom. It has been fully 22 rehabilitated after our flood and is the finest 23 courtroom I think we have in the place. And will 24 allow us to conduct voir dire beginning on Monday, 25 May 2nd, and so we will be moving the schedule up

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The issues, then, for us to consider 2 today, I want to address the Motion in Limine No. 3 4 6 as filed by the plaintiff. I did read the Merck 5 case, I want to take that up. And then I believe 6 we'll begin with the motions in limine for 7 defendants at No. 15, my notes indicate that's where that would be the next one we were to 8 9 address. Then I want to address the motion that 10 has been filed by the plaintiffs to identify all local contractors and then we'll seque into a 11 discussion on the questionnaire. I think that is 12 13 an important issue that we address today, if not 14 in its entirety, certainly preliminarily, so we 15 can get some direction there. And then I know there's other motions 16 17 that have been filed, I'm aware of a motion for 18 protective order. I have attempted to address all 19 of the motions as I could by prioritizing them to 20 the degree that I needed to to allow your case to 21 move forward within the confines of the other 2.2 conflicts on my schedule and other obligations 23 that I have.

So with that in mind, I am willing to open the floor to any additional dialogue on how

we ought to handle this morning and determine if 1 there's other issues we need to address. Let's 2 3 start with the plaintiffs. Anything that we need 4 to discuss urgently or that is problematic or 5 would change that schedule? 6 MR. BLAIR: No, Judge, I don't think 7 that there's anything urgent. THE COURT: Okay. Defense's side of 8 9 things? 10 MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, Jason Zager for 11 Monsanto. We do have several logistical issues that we would like to cover with the Court today. 12 13 However, I think based on what you just outlined, we probably can take those up at the end of the 14 15 hearing, would be, I think, probably the most 16 reasonable. 17 THE COURT: Sure. Let's go for about an 18 hour, then we'll take a break and we'll come back 19 for more. All right. So let's talk about Motion 20 in Limine No. 6 again. I have referenced, as I 21 indicated, I have read the Merck case, I have --2.2 and I'm prepared to hear any additional argument 23 you want to make on six, plaintiff's six, and I 24 may ask some questions. 25 MR. WOOL: Sure, Your Honor. So on six,

1	and I don't want to, you know, retread all the
2	ground that we went over last week. But in
3	addition to the point that what EPA might have
4	done had Monsanto proposed an adequate label being
5	a question for the Court and not the jury, you
6	know, I think that this issue really does go hand
7	in hand with Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 4.
8	Because what Monsanto would effectively be allowed
9	to argue, is that because it needs EPA approval to
10	put certain labels on its products at times, that
11	it would basically be making it an impossibility
12	preemption argument. It wouldn't that you
13	know, it would not be able to actually put a label
14	on its product. And that argument is simply wrong
15	as a matter of law.
16	If you look at the Hardeman Ninth
17	Circuit decisions, Monsanto's able to change its
18	label via the notification process, and that's
19	something that it can do irrespective of what EPA
20	decides. And so, you know, what we want to avoid
21	is having a side trial on the incredibly
22	complicated regulatory procedures that go into
23	label approval and all of that stuff, because it's
24	really irrelevant for the jury's determination.
25	The law is that Monsanto is at all times

responsible for the adequacy of the label, not EPA. And so that's really at the core of our argument.

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And I think that, you know, there are 4 5 two issues, right? One is avoiding wasting 6 everyone's time going into the incredibly complex 7 process of, you know, what EPA does vis-a-vis labels. And the second is to avoid really, you 8 9 know, incorrect legal argument to the jury that 10 would sort of allow the jury to assume the Court's 11 role and sort of -- you know, and particularly what we want to avoid is the jury saying Monsanto 12 13 was negligent, Monsanto failed to warn, but we're 14 going to give Monsanto a pass because we don't 15 think EPA would have approved a label. And so 16 that's why this was something that I think every 17 other court to issue -- to hear this issue has got 18 this type of argument out. And so we ask that 19 Your Honor do the same thing. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Hasken, are you going to

20 INE COORT: MI. HASKEN, are you going to 21 be arguing on this?

22 MR. HASKEN: Yes, Your Honor. The 23 framing of plaintiff's motion and how Mr. Wool is 24 presenting the motion, I think is just wrong for 25 what we're -- what -- they're trying to exclude

EPA regulatory evidence. They're trying to use 1 this Motion in Limine No. 6, Motion in Limine No. 2 4, you see it in motion in limine, Plaintiff's 3 Motion in Limine No. 5. They're trying to exclude 4 5 EPA's revised glyphosate issue paper where it 6 studies the carcinogenicity of glyphosate. 7 They're trying to exclude the revised 2017 paper where they restudy it further. They're trying to 8 9 exclude the Dear Registrant letter. 10 And they're calling it preemption. 11 They're saying if you let this evidence in, it's going to be confusing, it's going to be 12 preemption, they're arguing preemption. 13 That's 14 not why the evidence is coming in. That's not 15 what its probative value is. The probative value of EPA's actions, as it takes in the formal course 16 17 of a regulator issuing these reports, is it goes directly to the claims in the case. 18 It goes to 19 their negligent failure to warn and their negligent design claims. It goes to the punitive 20 21 damages claims. 2.2 Those claims, under Missouri law, 23 involve state of mind. They involve conduct. And 24 Missouri law is very clear that compliance with 25 regulatory action with industry standards is

relevant evidence to those claims. So we're 1 not -- this isn't coming in as preemption. I 2 mean, I can cite some of the cases, I mean, Lane 3 4 versus Armstead Industries, 779 S.W. 2nd 754, a 5 Missouri Western Court of Appeals case. On the 6 issue of punitive damages, and this is quote, 7 "Where the focus of the attention" -- I apologize, that's the wrong quote. But, "Compliance with 8 9 industry standard and custom impinges to prove the 10 defendant acted with a nonculpable state of mind." And in that case, that industry standard comes in. 11 And in that case it was a ANSI standard, 12 13 an industrial standard that came out seven or 14 eight years after the product was put on the 15 market, and the Court of Appeals says that comes 16 in. That comes in as probative of the claims in 17 the case. 18 THE COURT: Give me that page cite 19 again, sir. 779 S.W. 2nd? 754. And then the relevant 20 MR. HASKEN: 21 holding and the discussion is at 759 and 60 of 22 that case. And we see that throughout a lot of different cases. And we'd be happy to submit, if 23 24 you would like, a supplemental authorities on 25 these cases, if you would like. But, I mean, the

Alcorn versus Union Pacific, 50 S.W. 3rd 226, Missouri Supreme Court case from 2001, makes it abundantly clear that compliance with regulatory requirements comes in as relevant to punitive damages.

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So that is what -- this isn't about preemption. At no point are we going to be submitting, like I said last time, a director that asks the jury to make the findings of clear evidence that you saw articulated in the Merck versus Albrecht case. That is unequivocally a question of law for the Court. We're not -that's not why this evidence is relevant.

14 And then, additionally, the evidence is 15 also relevant to the extent it's about causation. 16 It's about EPA scientific findings about the 17 seminal question in this case. Which is, does 18 Roundup through glyphosate-based herbicides cause 19 cancer. And so if plaintiffs are going to rely on IARC and their experts are going to testify that 20 21 IARC is a basis for their opinions that Roundup 2.2 does cause cancer, then as a matter of 23 impeachment, as a matter of cross-examination, 24 something like the Dear Registrant letter has to 25 come in.

1	I mean, the first couple sentences, I
2	mean, it's the third sentence of the Dear
3	Registrant letter, EPA disagrees with IARC's
4	assessment of glyphosate. "EPA scientists have
5	performed an independent evaluation of available
6	data since the IARC classification to reexamine
7	the carcinogen carcinogenetic potential of
8	glyphosate and conclude that glyphosate is, quote,
9	'not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.'"
10	Closed quote.
11	So it's directly relevant to challenge
12	plaintiff's experts. If plaintiff's expert and
13	they do rely on IARC. From 2015, EPA's
14	re-examination of the data that IARC looked at in
15	conclusion as stated in these 2016 issue papers on
16	glyphosate, the 2017 issue paper, the 2019 Dear
17	Registrant letter saying we looked at IARC's data,
18	we disagree with it. It's relevant to come in to
19	challenge plaintiff's experts. It has nothing to
20	do with preemption. It has nothing to do with the
21	possibility of preemption.
22	So we respectfully think six should be
23	denied and we would ask Your Honor to reconsider
24	kind of the tentative interlocutory ruling from
25	last week about the Dear Registrant letter as

well.

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MR. WOOL: Your Honor, I think that 2 we're talking about two slightly different things 3 4 here. And I just want to be very clear about what 5 plaintiff's MIL No. 6 is about. Six is precisely about the 2019 letters of registrants and Monsanto 6 7 being able to argue to the jury that EPA would not have approved an adequate label. That's really 8 9 the focus of that motion. And, you know, the 10 other EPA decisions, whether it's the 2017 issue paper or the 2019 letter of registration decision, 11 12 those are kind of separate, right? 13 And, you know, Mr. Hasken raised the 14 point that Monsanto wants to be able to say, 15 "Well, EPA considered IARC's decision and rejected 16 it." Well, they have -- and he listed a number of 17 documents that stand for that proposition process 18 that Monsanto can use that say, you know, EPA did 19 consider this and disagreed with IARC apart from 20 that letter. Now, the reason that the letter in 21 particular is very confusing and misleading to the 2.2 jury, is because that speaks to a couple of things that aren't at issue here. It speaks to 23 24 Proposition 65, it speaks to what might have 25 happened if Monsanto had proposed an adequate

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And that's really what the focus of this motion is about. And we can talk about the other stuff in a minute, but, you know, I kind of think that it's important to keep the focus of this conversation on the topic at hand, which is whether Monsanto should be able to introduce the letter and argue to the jury that EPA would have rejected an adequate warning. And I think it's important, especially with respect to the letter, to remember that this letter was not the process of any formal EPA

11 letter was not the process of any formal EPA 12 action. It has no force of law, it's tantamount 13 14 to me calling up the court's clerk and the court clerk saying, well, you know, Judge McKenzie's 15 16 probably going to deny your motion. And me taking 17 that out and saying that's the same thing as getting a formal order from the Court. 18 It's not 19 -- you know, it's basically the same thing as if 20 you called up EPA and the person answering the 21 phone said, you know, EPA disagrees with IARC.

And so I think that Mr. Hasken's point about the other EPA documents that allow them to, you know, to kind of show that EPA did consider the IARC conclusion and rejected it, you know, I think that they've got a number of ways to do this without getting into the letter. Which, you know, as Your Honor knows, it only speaks to glyphosate, it doesn't speak to Roundup. It talks about rejecting a Proposition 65 warning, which has nothing to do with this case, it's a California law. And so, you know, apart from allowing Monsanto to make an argument that on its base is legally invalid, it introduces a considerable amount of confusion, we would have to introduce a lot of testimony about what Monsanto did ask EPA to do, what they didn't, what other registrants did.

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14 And in particular, you know, prior to this letter, a number of registrants did ask EPA 15 16 to put a cancer warning on their labels, EPA did 17 allow them to put that warning on. And, you know, and that's the type of evidence that we would have 18 19 to present if this argument is allowed to go forward. And we think that that's just really a 20 21 sideshow for the jury in terms of going into the 22 extraordinary complicated nature of EPA approvals and regulatory actions and that sort of thing. 23 24 And so, you know, in a nutshell, they have other 25 ways to show that EPA disagreed with IARC apart

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from this letter.

THE COURT: Okay. So as it relates to 2 3 this, I would like to first, you know, address 4 kind of the overarching issue of motions in limine 5 that it's -- it becomes a customary trend. 6 Motions in limine, to my way of thinking, are 7 strictly being ruled on based upon what is presented within the confines of the -- of a 8 9 synopsis of what you're asking the Court to 10 preclude. What is the natural inclination of 11 attorneys is to expand on that and attempt to, within that, also consider that you can conclude 12 13 other things or also being excluded, because, gee 14 whiz, if we follow this path, the judge must also 15 mean this is excluded. 16 Natural inclination in every case we 17 have, I understand it and I am strictly telling 18 you that's not how it works. With this motion, I 19 want to address within the Merck case important elements of it that I think should be some element 20 21 of a guide post on this subject matter. And 2.2 because I know that there seems to be an obvious 23 conflict between the EPA scientist and perhaps the 24 IARC scientist, and there's going to be a lot of 25 inquiry of the experts on this subject in a

variety of ways. And that's by no means lost on me, because I've read many a page where that's a part of the conversation. But let's read into the record Justice Brennan's part of this opinion so we're all establishing what I think and where we're at. I go into the opinion and I find it on Page 833 of the lawyer's edition. "And in the Court of Appeals' view for a defendant to establish a preemption defense under Wyatt, the fact finder must conclude that it is highly probable that the FDA would not have approved a change to the drug's label. Moreover and importantly, the Court of Appeals also held that whether the FDA would have rejected a proposed label change is a question of fact that must be answered by a jury." If you reference further down in the opinion under Footnote 6, it states after a cite, "We here decide that a judge, not a jury, must decide the preemption question and we elaborate

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decide the preemption question and we elaborate Wyatt's requirements along the way." Then it also references an explanation of why that is. Found on -- sometimes I get confused on what page we're on. It appears it's on Page 837. "The complexity

1	of the preceding discussion of the law helps to
2	illustrate why we answer this question by
3	concluding that the question is a legal one for
4	the judge, not a jury."
5	It goes into another description of
6	that, I'm not reading everything into it. But it
7	reads also on 837, and with two words onto Page
8	838, "To understand the question as a legal
9	question for judges makes sense, given the fact
10	that judges are normally familiar with principles
11	of administrative law. Doing so should produce
12	greater uniformity among courts, and greater
13	uniformity is normally a virtue when a question
14	requires a determination concerning the scope and
15	effect of federal agency action."
16	I read that into the record because I am
17	aware that there has been a lot of dialogue on
18	this. I sustain Motion in Limine No. 6, because
19	what Motion in Limine No. 6 requests is that the
20	Court preclude any testimony or evidence that the
21	EPA would have rejected a proposed labeling change
22	by Monsanto. In other words, that does not go
23	into the science by whatever their analysis was
24	for why they came to that conclusion. It is the
25	conclusion. Because this Court in Merck says

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specifically, these regulatory issues are for a judge because of the nature of those proceedings, not for a jury. And so I've already ruled on preemption, clearly.

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5 And so when it comes to the science and 6 your concerns in that regard, Mr. Hasken, and 7 whether this ruling then allows that that evidence would be eliminated as being considered, the fact 8 9 is no. Because that's not what I'm addressing 10 I'm addressing the specifics of whether here. 11 anyone would have rejected a proposed labeling change by Monsanto because it's specifically 12 relating to a regulatory action by a regulatory 13 14 agency, which is outside the bounds of what Merck 15 appears to present to me as a specific thing for a 16 jury to consider. Okay? Much more elaborate on 17 that ruling than many others, because I think it 18 does afford us a synopsis of an analysis of many 19 different rulings on some of these subjects. If that's not clear to you, let me know. 20

But -- and what you'll find in my order is, sustained. Not a long dialogue on why it's sustained, because I've already told you. MR. HASKEN: Your Honor, can I make a very short record?

1 THE COURT: Sure. 2 MR. HASKEN: Monsanto does -- agrees 3 that the preemption question, impossibility 4 preemption question, clear evidence in Merck 5 versus Albrecht, is a question of law. 6 Undisputed. Our position is simply that EPA's 7 actions, including its actions informing registrants of glyphosate-based herbicides that it 8 9 would be misbranding to put a cancer warning, and 10 its final or interim registration decision in January of 2020 also saying a cancer warning isn't 11 necessary, is admissible evidence that goes 12 towards the claims in this case. And so that 13 14 issue is separate and apart from whether or not 15 preemption, the legal construct of it, would be 16 presented to the jury. 17 And as we do go down this road further, 18 Ms. Sastre or Mr. Adams, I assume, most likely 19 will try to convince you that this evidence comes 20 in for its probative value, its impeachment value 21 and I just want to make clear that we do believe 2.2 that this is relevant to susbstantive claims in this case. And as we understand your ruling in 23 24 No. 5 from last time, a lot of it's -- a lot of it 25 was not sustained on plaintiff's motion as well.

1	THE COURT: Say that again, sir, I
2	didn't understand the last word you said.
3	MR. HASKEN: That there is a specific
4	Motion in Limine No. 5 where you granted a ruling
5	specifically about some of these regulatory
6	documents that is unchanged from this particular
7	ruling on No. 6 about preemption.
8	THE COURT: Right. Now, I understand
9	the distinction between the two and I understand
10	preemption as a matter of law, but I also
11	understand what Merck's talking about. And I
12	would presume that the FDA and the EPA have some
13	regulatory approaches to the subject that are
14	different because of the difference in the
15	products or the you know, that they are
16	individually regulating.
17	Because obviously there's a vast
18	difference between a pesticide and a and some
19	medicine there or drug that's being regulated
20	because of the nature of what we're talking about
21	between, you know, the efficacy of allowing
22	someone to be cured of an illness, knowing that
23	there's a possibility that there's some side
24	effects that could present itself, and apparently
25	a balancing of the concerns regarding efficacy and

side effects. That's obviously apparent. And you all practice in this area more than I do, you would be able to tell me better. And I would presume the EPA has a different analysis to afford in that regard.

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6 So these are interlocutory, I suspect I 7 will hear many times these subjects. But let's talk about that, because this is something I don't 8 9 want you to get lost on. What I find in jury 10 trials, and especially long jury trials, that in my experience in the past, there has been an 11 12 obligation and a sense that we are affording not 13 enough time in the courtroom with the jury in the 14 box, and too much time with the jury in the jury 15 room waiting for us to address legal arguments. 16 And I find that to be very problematic.

17 And so I'm referencing this now for two 18 Number one, we do have the ability to reasons. 19 allow jurors to regulate when they're coming in so that they're not obliged at -- to -- at 9:00 20 21 o'clock, sit over there until 10:30 while we argue 2.2 through things. So we need to be aware that if 23 there's issues to be addressed, that we be 24 confronting that so we can allow the jurors' 25 schedules to be changed, perhaps, from day to day,

so we're not making them sit over there waiting for us with nothing to do but sit there. I think it -- not only is it not helpful, it can cause problems. It can cause problems, you know, for a number of reasons.

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6 So what you can expect is, is that I 7 will afford you some time to argue issues. We will be in the courtroom by 8:00 a.m. almost every 8 9 day. I can't eliminate the rest of my docket, and 10 at the same time, court reporters have to be given 11 their break. I need less breaks than a court reporter because my job isn't physical. 12 Theirs 13 is. We all know that. So I may say you are 14 limited in the amount of time that you have to 15 address an issue. You have five minutes, you have 16 ten minutes. Because I don't want a jury who 17 expects to come into the courtroom at 9:00 a.m. to 18 be obliged to sit over there for inordinate 19 amounts of time while we address legal issues. So 20 we need to be prepared on that and we need to be 21 aware of the necessity of doing it that way. 2.2 Okay? 23 I don't think that you lawyers who have 24 done this are unaware of those problems arising 25 from time to time and I want to confront them

1	right from the beginning so there's no surprise
2	when I start taking action like that, okay?
3	MR. ADAMS: Very good, Your Honor. Your
4	Honor, on that particular point.
5	THE COURT: Robert Adams, by the way.
6	MR. ADAMS: Yep, thank you. Mr. Hasken
7	said we will probably raise this in the future, I
8	think things are going to become clear, especially
9	after opening. The reason why all of this stuff
10	my view is, is that the EPA documents which
11	are government documents and will be admissible
12	under the statute, the reason why they come in,
13	there's a variety of reasons. But why a lot of
14	the particular documents, especially this Dear
15	Registrant letter comes in, is because it's
16	relevant on punitive damages.
17	I know you're very familiar with the
18	Alcorn case and the Suzuki case. The type of
19	arguments that they're making here are made in
20	almost any type of case where there is a
21	government investigation, where there is a finding
22	by a government entity about an accident or a
23	particular defect investigation. So I know you're
24	very familiar with the Rodriguez versus Suzuki
25	case. In that case, you know, the issue was

whether government reports by NHTSA, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, should have come in. Two of those reports were after the accident. And the Supreme Court said, you know, recognizing that there's certain issues that are associated with that preemption, different arguments, but they're relevant to punitive damages and the state of mind of the defendant.

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9 And so that's one of the things that I 10 wanted to point out here, is that Missouri law is 11 very clear that while some of this evidence may not be relevant to the issue of defect, it may not 12 be relevant to the issue of failure to warn. 13 Τf 14 it's relevant to the state of mind of the 15 defendant, then it comes in. And so their 16 argument that, well, we're arguing preemption. 17 We're not. We are stating to the Court that under 18 Missouri law, it is highly relevant as to the 19 defendant's state of -- the mind as to whether a warning is necessary, that the government 20 21 authority in charge of warning labels has said 2.2 that we will not allow a warning on a product that contains glyphosate, that says it's going to cause 23 24 cancer or that IARC has found that it's probable 25 that it's going to cause cancer. That's why it

comes in. It's not a preemption argument, but 1 2 it's directly relevant to the state of mind of the defendant. 3 4 I also wanted to make it perfectly clear that this Dear Registrant letter -- and Mr. Wool 5 said it a couple of times -- is only relevant to 6 7 glyphosate. The first line of the letter says, "We are writing to you concerning the label and 8 labeling requirements for products that contain 9 10 glyphosate." That means Roundup. That's directly relevant to their argument that, well, Monsanto, 11 you should have put a warning label on your 12 product after IARC made this conclusion. And the 13 14 finding is -- and, you know, we'd be willing, even 15 if the Court finds it necessary, we could redact 16 certain portions of this. But the finding of the 17 EPA in direct response to that argument is, is 18 that you can't put that type of warning whether 19 it's based on IARC onto your labels. And that's why it comes in. 20 21 So again, I wanted to highlight that 2.2 because it's a very important issue in this case and we will be revisiting that later. And like 23

advance some of the punitive damage cases that

Mr. Hasken said, we'd be happy to, you know,

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make it very clear that this type of evidence comes in because it's relevant to the issue of state of mind. Not only under Alcorn, but under Rodriguez.

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5 I'll tell you, my personal experience 6 in, for example, the Liberty bus case involving 7 NTSB investigation, that came into evidence. The same type of arguments were made in that case. 8 9 That was by Mr. Robb, Gary Robb, and the court 10 allowed it in. And the Court of Appeals affirmed Similar to the medical device case that Ms. 11 that. Sastre and I tried in front of Mr. -- Judge 12 13 Scheiber. All of the findings by the government 14 came into evidence. Same arguments were made. 15 You know, they're making a preemption argument. 16 We're not. It's relevant to punitive damages. 17 And again, I appreciate the Court's indulgence in 18 letting me speak on that issue, but it is very 19 important to the parties in this case.

THE COURT: You're free to, you know, brief anything on those subjects that you want to. You know, these hearings allow me to hear with a little more specificity those points to which you find to be of real significance that, you know, I need to zero in on. Not lost on me, I'll do it.

1	MR. ADAMS: Very good.
2	THE COURT: And present it. Pretrial
3	briefs, right? I mean, do what you need to do. I
4	suspect I'm going to see a trial brief at some
5	point.
6	MR. ADAMS: You certainly will.
7	THE COURT: All right. Let's move on.
8	And so we can certainly hear the arguments on the
9	motion in limine filed by the defendants. I think
10	we're up to No. 15, that's what my notes show. If
11	you think I'm wrong about that, I'm glad to re
12	MR. ADAMS: No, you're exactly right,
13	Your Honor. And I'll be handling the motion. And
14	this is Robert Adams, for the court reporter,
15	representing Monsanto. Monsanto's Motion in
16	Limine No. 15 moves
17	THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Adams. I'm in
18	the courtroom, someone's walked in. Off the
19	record, please.
20	(Discussion off the record.)
21	THE COURT: Okay. Sorry.
22	MR. ADAMS: No problem. Monsanto's
23	Motion in Limine No. 15 is to exclude reference to
24	glyphosate bans. Bans is a term of art used
25	primarily by the plaintiffs in these cases, where

they will point to different municipalities or counties or in some cases entities overseas that have made decisions not based upon science, but based upon other factors, to say that they're going to limit the use of glyphosate-based products, which includes Roundup, in their particular area.

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And the basis of our motion is that that 8 9 type of unscientific finding is not legally --10 logically relevant to the issues in this case. 11 It's prejudicial because the suggestion that there has been a, quote, ban, closed quote, on a 12 13 glyphosate-based product, which is Roundup, brings 14 to mind in the jury that that's based on science. 15 They're not based on science. And we'll be able 16 to show that. The direct implication is, is that 17 -- the basis is, is that there was some type of 18 regulatory agency or some type of scientific 19 entity that determined that Roundup or glyphosate-based product causes cancer. 20 That 21 doesn't exist in these cases and that's why it's 2.2 prejudicial. 23 In this case, we're dealing with Mr. 24

Shelton who lived in Kansas City. And there is no ban on glyphosate in Kansas City or in Missouri, and there's no ban in the United States. So it raises a tangential issue, too, that would lead to Monsanto having to point out that, oh, by the way, this, quote, ban that the plaintiffs are referring to is not based on science, it doesn't have anything to do with the issues that we're trying in this case. And so it is -- that's again the reason why it's not legally or logically relevant. Two courts -- and we cited this in our

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10 papers, Your Honor -- two courts that have 11 addressed this exact issue have excluded it. Ι would reference the Court to Attachment B., the 12 Caballero Court. And that is attachment to our 13 14 motion on Pages 56 and 57. The trial judge goes 15 into the rationale for excluding that type of 16 information. And essentially the information that 17 they offered in that case, which I believe will be 18 the same type of information that the plaintiff's 19 lawyers will offer in this case, is that the 20 so-called evidence based on -- that supports these 21 bans is based on hearsay articles and newspapers 22 and things like that and that it's not based upon a scientific determination. 23 24 So again, if you reference Page 57 in

particular, I think is relevant to the Court's

issue right here, that in that case the Court 1 actually examined the evidence and determined that 2 it's not relevant to the case. And based on that, 3 4 Your Honor, I think that you should exclude any 5 reference to a so-called ban. MR. WOOL: Your Honor, this is merely 6 7 the other side of the coin that we were talking about earlier with EPA evidence and that we talked 8 9 about last week with Monsanto's introduction of 10 the foreign regulatory decisions. What Monsanto is effectively arguing is that it wants to be able 11 to introduce the regulatory decisions that it 12 finds favorable and exclude the ones that go 13 14 against it. 15 Now, you've heard a lot about how these decisions weren't based on science, but not a lot 16 17 as far as what they were based on. I would also 18 point out that there have been a number of foreign 19 regulatory decisions since that Caballero case. So, you know, really, all that we are trying to do 20 21 is kind of show the jury the entire picture, that 2.2 if Monsanto's going to say, hey, EPA and these foreign regulatory decisions support us, just show 23 24 the jury that that's not unanimous and that there 25 are regulatory agencies out there, municipalities

all across the board who have evaluated the 1 science, who have looked at IARC, relied on IARC 2 3 or other evidence, and have concluded that 4 glyphosate should be banned and that it's 5 dangerous. 6 And so, you know, I think that it would 7 be highly misleading to allow Monsanto to paint a one-sided and inaccurate picture that every 8 9 regulatory bodies who look at this has concluded 10 that it's safe, because that's just not true. 11 MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, briefly. I'd address, you know, Mr. Wool argues that this is --12 13 the bans are relevant to rebut the proposition 14 that regulatory agencies have determined that the 15 product is safe, it doesn't require a warning, 16 based upon a scientific review. Well, the 17 problem, as I pointed out before, is that the bans 18 are not based upon science. And, in fact, the 19 Court in Caballero said that the plaintiffs, if they could establish that the ban is actually 20 21 based upon science and supported by independent 2.2 scientific endeavor, comparable to that of these regulatory agencies, then the Court may consider 23 They can't do that, because these bans are 24 it. 25 not based upon science finding that there is an

issue with respect to Roundup or glyphosate-based 1 herbicide causing cancer. That's the problem. 2 3 It's apples and oranges. The apple is that we're going to refer 4 5 to the EPA, Health Canada and a variety of 6 different regulatory agencies that did engage in a 7 very robust scientific review of all of the evidence to determine whether the product would be 8 9 allowed to be used in the country, whether the 10 product needs a label on it. All of those 11 agencies concluded that the product is fine, it's not carcinogenic, you don't need a label on it. 12 What plaintiff's want to refer to are decisions 13 14 like from a municipality or county saying you're 15 not going to be able to use it here because we're concerned about insects or bees. That's an 16 17 orange. So that's why the bans should not be 18 referenced in this case. 19 THE COURT: Anything further? MR. WOOL: Your Honor, I guess if the 20 21 ban is only related to bees or insects, that's 2.2 something that, you know, we're not going to look 23 like fools getting up in front of the jury and say 24 glyphosate is banned here because of bees. What 25 we would want to introduce are the bans and

regulatory decisions that relate to the human health concerns. So I don't think that there's a direct conflict here on that. And again, I think this is just necessary so that the jury's not misled into thinking that, you know, that the case is completely one-sided. THE COURT: Okay. Well, look, the limited information I have on this is contained I

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think -- let me take a look at this real quick, because there's so many of those that I can't analyze them without some additional review.

At this stage, without additional 12 13 information, I would sustain the motion in part 14 and deny it in part. I would sustain it to the 15 extent that, you know, there has to be some scientific foundation established for certain 16 17 entities to have indicated that they were banning 18 this product as a result of a human issue. I 19 think the goose-gander approach addressed by Ms. Sastre last week is a good one here. I mean, if 20 21 we're going to get into regulatory agencies and 2.2 their methodology of what they're doing, then to 23 look at this and consider that every ban is 24 excluded carte blanche is not fair, because those 25 bans could be based upon perhaps scientific

evidence that's to the contrary. 1 And without knowing more, I -- and to 2 give you this indication that you'll not get into 3 any of this would be unfair, because then that 4 5 would lead you to preparation for trial, thinking 6 that you're not going to get into any of these 7 So the ultimate position I would take is, bans. it depends. What's the ban for? What's the ban 8 9 based on? Mr. Adams referenced exhibits. Within 10 one of the exhibits, there's a reference to 11 Germany banning it because of concerns about insects and that it's going to kill green and kill 12 insects. Well, I don't know if that's the entire 13 14 document, I don't know where that's at. And I 15 don't know what number of bans we're talking 16 about? Are we talking about seven, are we talking 17 about 70 or are we talking about 700? I don't 18 know. 19 So there's a limitation on how to 20 approach this. But I think the best approach I 21 can give you preliminarily as we sit here, is I 22 sustain it unless you can establish that the bans are based upon a regulatory decision relating to 23

or something to that effect, you know, just some

science and IARC, you know, has been found by IARC

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scientific approach to that issue. Because all 1 this regulatory evidence, it's -- if it's coming 2 3 in, then I would presume that some of that 4 regulatory evidence on the flipside should also be 5 considered. MR. ROE FRAZER: Yes, Your Honor. 6 As I 7 understand it, goose-gander, for any bans they want to talk about, they have to have a scientific 8 9 foundation for. THE COURT: 10 Right. MR. ROE FRAZER: Yes, sir. 11 THE COURT: But, you know, when I 12 13 overruled the motion in limine, I overruled it 14 because it was my perception, incorrect, that 15 those regulatory decisions were being based upon, 16 you know, an analysis of the science, you know, 17 not on a political, you know, analysis or a 18 political body including on a vote what they were 19 going to do. So a lot of this is -- you know, you 20 all handling these cases with regularity doesn't 21 allow -- allows you a lot of information, but it 2.2 doesn't give it to me. So let me write this down 23 so we can be real clear. 24 MR. ROE FRAZER: Yes, Your Honor, I 25 think I misspoke. I said if they -- I said
1	banned. If they subject an approval as to be
2	scientific based. A regulatory approval.
3	THE COURT: Sure. To be you kwow, to
4	establish a bright line rule there, Mr. Frazer, I
5	think would be perhaps sending us down a different
6	path. Because, again, I'm trying to, you know,
7	embrace the entirety of the science that you're
8	describing and that might take some time. And so
9	some of these rulings may be difficult to make
10	until I hear more. But let me just finish what
11	I've written here and let's see if this let's
12	see this through.
13	I have written without with an eye to
14	editorialization, after additional conversation,
15	sustained in part and denied in part. Sustained
16	unless the ban is founded upon a regulatory
17	decision and/or science regarding glyphosate or
18	perhaps Roundup, I don't know what the ban was
19	related to, being carcinogenic to humans.
20	MR. ADAMS: That's fine, Your Honor.
21	Thank you. I think we all understand your ruling.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Wool, you're on mute
23	maybe.
24	MR. WOOL: I was just concurring. I
25	think that's the right line to draw.

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1	THE COURT: Okay. Move on to No. 16.
2	MR. ADAMS: Madam Court Reporter, this
3	is Robert Adams from Monsanto. I'm also covering
4	this motion. Motion In Liminie 16 seeks to
5	exclude any evidence, arguments or reference to
6	Bayer's recent decision to discontinue
7	glyphosate-based Roundup sales. And in
8	particular, Your Honor, this is focused on a
9	recent press release and also announcement made by
10	Bayer that in 2023 and this is attached to our
11	motion in 2023, the company is going to
12	discontinue sales in solely the U.S. residential
13	lawn and market lawn and garden market
14	regarding Roundup. And that press release goes on
15	to say that this move is being made exclusively to
16	manage litigation risk and not because of any
17	safety concerns.
18	So what plaintiffs want to do is say
19	that this is relevant to the issue of whether
20	Monsanto should take the product off the market or
21	Monsanto should issue a warning, that it's
22	relevant to the issue that the product is
23	carcinogenic. It's not relevant to the issue and,
24	in fact, it's extremely prejudicial to allow into
25	evidence that this limited discontinuation of

1	sales is somehow relevant to any issue in the
2	case. Because it's not.
3	The problem that admission of this
4	evidence leads to is, as I referenced in the press
5	release announcing it, is that it was made
6	exclusively to manage litigation risk and not
7	because of any safety concerns. So if this
8	document is admitted, then it requires us to go
9	into the fact that the company has been deluged by
10	lawsuits promoted by aggressive advertising by
11	plaintiff's lawyers, and I'm not being critical of
12	that, it's just a fact, that motivated the company
13	to discontinue sales in the lawn and garden use.
14	And what the Court needs to understand
15	is that that is a very limited fraction of the
16	total sales of glyphosate. Glyphosate is going to
17	be continue to be sold to farmers and, in fact, if
18	you want to go out and buy glyphosate in 2023, you
19	may not be able to buy it in the retail store, but
20	you can go to a tractor supply store and buy it.
21	So again, that is why this type of evidence is
22	extremely prejudicial and it's really not
23	relevant. The plaintiff's response is, is that,
24	well, it goes to the feasibility of the fact that
25	the company would take the product off the market.

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1	Well, that could be true in any case. I mean, any
2	company can take their product off the market.
3	The problem is, again, is that it's
4	extremely prejudicial, because it puts us in a
5	position of having to bring it out, and I don't
6	think the plaintiffs are going to like this, that
7	the that this was based upon an evaluation of
8	the litigation risk that and if you see the
9	advertising cost that has been incurred since the
10	IARC decision, it will blow your mind. And all of
11	that is going to be opened by this type of
12	evidence coming in. So we don't think it's an
13	appropriate issue that should be gone into in
14	front of the jury. It's going to create a
15	sideshow that ultimately is not going to be
16	relevant to the issue of whether there should have
17	been a warning or whether the product is
18	defective.
19	MR. MCMURTRAY: Good morning, Your
20	Honor. Patrick McMurtray for plaintiffs. Number
21	one, of course, Mr. Adams did not give you any
22	legal reason why it shouldn't be allowed. This is
23	not a post-injury remedial measure, this is a
24	public announcement by the defendant. And number
25	two, it's significant here because it shows that

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regardless of all of these regulatory defenses that they've been throwing up since last Friday, that Monsanto can, at its own choosing, choose to withdraw the product from a specific use market in a specific geographical market whenever it wants to with no approval of EPA, no notice to EPA, no Dear Applicant letter needed. They can do this whenever they want to. It shows that when they choose to do it, they can.

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10 They've made self-serving public 11 statements here blaming the lawyers for their decisions and now they want to be protected from 12 13 that statement. But they simply can't have it 14 both ways. Their argument in asking you to ignore 15 what they're saying in the court of public 16 opinion, is that it's -- that's going to create a 17 mini trial. No, it's not, Your Honor. They're 18 going to -- if it comes in, and it should, they're 19 going to attack the plaintiff's bar. And Mr. Adams was acting like we didn't expect that to 20 21 begin with. There will be attacks on the 2.2 plaintiff's bar and plaintiff's counsel in this 23 trial regardless of whether you allow this 24 statement to be in. 25

The only reason they want to keep it out

is they realize that their explanation simply 1 isn't believable or credible, and so they want to 2 3 avoid that. In fact, it shows that apparently the 4 only risk-benefit analysis of this product that 5 they've done is with regard to litigation. And Your Honor, none of that, none of that is reason 6 7 to keep the statement of the defendant out, because it shows what they could have done, should 8 9 have done. And if they need to explain their 10 statement, that's a short explanation. 11 THE COURT: When I read this motion in 12 limine and then I read the response, I -- and wrote the words "subsequent remedial measure" next 13 14 to the motion. And I don't understand why that 15 isn't being addressed legally. Because perhaps 16 I'm not aware of it, so but why isn't it relevant? 17 I mean, why isn't that legal argument relevant to 18 the conversation? 19 MR. ADAMS: I think it is, Your Honor. 20 MR. MCMURTRAY: Because they're not 21 admitting that the product causes anything, Your 22 Honor. They deny any causation, and so there's 23 no -- this is not a reaction to an injury, they're 24 saying it's a reaction to the evil plaintiff's 25 bar. And that's not subsequent remedial measure.

It's not like they put up a warning. That would 1 2 be the classic example, Your Honor, that they finally admit that they are wrong. They put a 3 4 warning on the product, then you're right, we 5 couldn't get that subsequent warning in. But here 6 they are deliberately choosing the path of, oh, 7 we're taking this off because of the lawyers, not because it's an unsafe -- not because it's an 8 9 unsafe product. 10 MR. ADAMS: And Your Honor, it isn't akin to a subsequent remedial measure. I mean, it 11 is not relevant. The fact that it's -- and I 12 13 think the key point is, is that the fact that 14 we're going to continue to sell -- the vast 15 majority of Roundup sales is going to continue to 16 go on. We're just -- because of the litigation 17 risk associated with consumers that are bombarded 18 with advertisements to file cases, that's why 19 we're going to discontinue it in a limited market. And so it's not relevant. 20 21 And Mr. McMurtray says, well, Mr. Adams 2.2 doesn't cite any case. You can find a ton of cases under Missouri law dealing with the issue of 23 24 whether it's legally and logically relevant. 25 Here, the prejudice and the waste of time and

1	confusion of issues associated with bringing this
2	in front of the jury is shows that it should
3	not come into evidence.
4	THE COURT: Well, here's the so the
5	feasibility argument. I can I can embrace a
6	feasibility argument if we're talking about the
7	Crown Vic and where they put a gas tank. I can
8	embrace it in the other engineering concepts where
9	you have the whatever that engineering
10	principle is, you know, where you, you know, your
11	first is to eliminate it. If you can't eliminate,
12	then you guard it. And if you can't guard it,
13	then you warn about it. And so there's that
14	feasibility analysis.
15	Here, I don't know where you move the
16	ball down the field on, you know, whether a
17	company can or cannot take a product off the
18	market and eliminate it and then that be there
19	be dialogue on that. I mean, sure, you can pull a
20	market off the you can pull a product off the
21	market. Now, I suppose Bayer could pull aspirin
22	off the market, too. Nobody could stop them from
23	pulling aspirin off the market, they just do it.
24	And so here's the point. You know, I
25	suspect there will be, other, other dialogue on

I sustain the motion. I don't -- I see it 1 this. 2 as a subsequent remedial measure. I don't see any 3 basis for it to be admissible, especially in 2023, 4 for an incident that happened as long ago as a 5 decade or more since the exposure or whatever the 6 exposure time frame is. Because I think an 7 analysis of that would allow us to go down a path with incredible amounts of information that would 8 9 be prejudicial to both sides. That this is just 10 a -- you know, you could have pulled it off the 11 market. Yeah, but we didn't because it was only after you lawyers came in and started suing 12 everybody. And then all of a sudden that 13 14 devolves. 15 I just don't see where that's going to 16 be helpful, nor do I find that this necessarily 17 creates an opportunity to present an argument on 18 feasibility. It's always feasible. So that's my 19 ruling. 20 MR. ROE FRAZER: Your Honor, could I ask 21 one question, please? 2.2 THE COURT: Sure. 23 MR. ROE FRAZER: Since that was not 24 argued in their motion as a post-remedial measure, 25 would -- and we weren't ready for that, we would

ask that they have to reform their motion and file In that I understand the Court's ruling, not it. trying to reargue the ruling. But we would ask that Monsanto take a public position that this is a post-remedial measure, Your Honor. It's not in their motion and it wasn't in their argument until Your Honor brought it up and Mr. Adams then in his reply mentioned it. So we would request that they formally amend their motion and put that reason in there as a grounds for this motion in limine to be sustained. MR. ADAMS: And, Your Honor, with all due respect, that's not an appropriate argument to be made. I mean, we could be here for weeks if based upon the law you make decisions and then we ask, well, can they reamend their motion to include certain bases. I mean, we're -- neither side cited any law in the case other than the basic law that you can exclude evidence that is not logically and legally relevant. That's what you did. So with all due respect, we don't think

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20 not logically and legally relevant. That's wha 21 you did. So with all due respect, we don't thi 22 that the Court should engage in a process of 23 having parties amend their motion to include 24 certain things that the opposition wants to be 25 included in the motion.

THE COURT: I'm ruling on the evidence 1 that the evidence comes in and I'm making 2 3 evidentiary rulings that I think are appropriate, 4 regardless of the bases that one party or the other concludes that it should or shouldn't be 5 6 included. So I'm going to deny the request that 7 they have to reform that or reframe that. I don't 8 know what purpose it would have in the Allan 9 Shelton case. And so I'm going to move on. 10 All right. Let's move on to 17. 11 MR. ADAMS: I've got good news for Your 12 Honor and the plaintiff's counsel here. We are going to withdraw Monsanto's Motion in Limine No. 13 14 17 after, you know, some of the discussion that 15 the Court has had earlier last week and today. So 16 we're withdrawing No. 17. And our next motion is 17 Defendant's No. 20. THE COURT: Can we take a break and 18 19 let's address that in about five or ten minutes, 20 okay? 21 MR. ADAMS: Very good, Your Honor. 2.2 Thank you. 23 (Short recess was taken.) 24 THE COURT: All right. Let's address 25 No. 20, please.

MR. HASKEN: Good morning, Your Honor. 1 Tim Hasken for defendant Monsanto. In Defendant's 2 3 Motion in Limine No. 20, we are seeking to exclude 4 the argumentative and pejorative term "ghost 5 writing." The term stems from one email by one Monsanto employee about one scientific paper from 6 This is out of the thousands of emails 7 2000. produced in this case, the hundreds of scientific 8 9 papers relevant to the issues in this case. And 10 the term "ghost writing," which is undefined, it 11 is argumentative, will simply mislead and distract the jury from the actual issues. 12 13 Now, plaintiffs have developed evidence 14 that Monsanto paid for certain studies or that 15 Monsanto was involved in the editing of certain 16 studies. And that's fine. But to call all this, 17 argumentatively, ghost writing, to claim that --18 to put everything under this Monsanto's 19 participation in science in the development of scientific articles, under this umbrella of this 20 21 argumentative term that shows up in one email 2.2 about one article with no definition, adds nothing to the case. It is misleading, it is confusing 23 24 and it should be excluded. 25 MR. WOOL: Your Honor, David Wool for

the plaintiff. First of all, this is not 1 2 plaintiff's term. This is not something like magic tumor. This is Monsanto's own term. It is 3 4 not true that this comes from a single email, 5 there are multiple documents. Mr. Hasken 6 referenced the 2000 ghost written article. This 7 term also comes up in an employee review where he is praised for ghost writing the article. 8 This 9 has been allowed into every trial that has gone forward. 10 And in particular as to one employee who 11 12 ghost wrote articles that are separate from the 2000 article that Mr. Hasken referenced, I'd like 13 14 to just point Your Honor to a part of the 15 transcript. And that is David Saltmiras, Pages 68 16 to 69. He's asked, "So are you suggesting" -- he 17 says, "So are you suggesting that I have ghost written?" Question: "Have you?" Answer: "Yes." 18 19 Question: "Tell us the different ways in which 20 you have ghost written. As you said, there are 21 different situations." Answer: "So one situation 2.2 I can think of is in a manuscript termed Grime, et al.'" And that's a 2015 paper. 23 24 And so the notion that this is just one 25 limited incident is just simply false. And this

goes directly to Monsanto's liability and state of 1 2 mind. It goes to the various regulatory decisions 3 that we've talked about before, because EPA relies 4 on these ghost written articles. And it wasn't 5 until this litigation that anybody knew that it 6 was actually Monsanto that was writing the 7 articles and paying more reputable authors to put their names on there so the articles carried more 8 9 weight. So I think this is a fairly easy open and 10 shut issue. 11 THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Wool, what was the name? You referenced a person's deposition? 12 MR. WOOL: David Saltmiras. S-a-l-t --13 14 sorry, let me actually get this so I know I get it 15 right for you. I'm terrible at spelling, as 16 you've probably guessed. S-a-l-t-m-i-r-a-s. 17 THE COURT REPORTER: Thank you so much. 18 MR. HASKEN: Just briefly on reply. The 19 evidence is going to show that Monsanto -- in almost all these cases, Monsanto's financial 20 contribution disclosed in the statement of 21 22 interest, Monsanto employees that participated in 23 the article's review process are disclosed in the 24 statement of interest. And the example Mr. Wool 25 gave demonstrates the problem. Ghost writing is

not a term that means anything. So if they want 1 to put in evidence that Monsanto edited an article 2 3 before it went to the journal, that's fine. But 4 you can't call it ghost writing, because the term 5 itself means nothing. It has no value. And what 6 they're going to do is they're going to call every 7 action by a Monsanto employee, whether it's involved in paying for a study, whether it's 8 9 involved in sending study materials to an author 10 or editing a manuscript, they're going to call it 11 all ghost writing. But again, it's an argumentative term, it's untethered from facts and 12 13 it has no value. It has no other prejudice in 14 this trial. 15 MR. WOOL: Your Honor, ghost writing is 16 a --17 THE COURT: Overruled. No. 30, The 18 George study. 19 MR. HASKEN: Yes, Your Honor. Tim 20 Hasken for defendant. The George study is not, as 21 it's designed, a carcinogenicity study. The 2.2 George study, as its study designers intended, 23 does not prove, does not show anything about 24 Roundup's carcinogenicity. And for that reason, 25 IARC excluded George from its hazard assessment.

EPA excluded the George study from its risk assessment. The European regulators do not consider George in their risk assessment.

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The George Study -- and that's what this case is about. Does Roundup cause cancer? The George study doesn't answer that question. It's not designed to answer that question. It's not a mouse feeding study like some other toxicology studies are that will come in. It's a different type of study. And it simply doesn't go to whether Roundup causes cancer. And that's why all the major scientific bodies and regulatory bodies exclude it from their assessments and it should be excluded here.

15 MR. WOOL: Your Honor, David Wool again. 16 This is an attempt at a second bite of the apple 17 for Monsanto. In Your Honor's ruling allowing Dr. 18 Sawyer's testimony, I believe Your Honor 19 specifically allowed his testimony on the George study. And this idea that every single study has 20 21 to get plaintiffs all the way there in terms of 2.2 proving cancer just isn't the way that science 23 works. There are a ton of studies out there, I 24 don't think any person is arguing that any one 25 study by itself proves our case or for Monsanto

that a single study proves Roundup's safety. 1 The George study is what's called a 2 3 promotor study, to see if glyphosate and Roundup, 4 you know, encourage already developed cancers to 5 continue to develop. I think it's scientifically relevant. And again, most importantly, Your Honor 6 7 has already ruled that this is coming in through 8 Dr. Sawyer. 9 MR. HASKEN: Your Honor, none of IARC's 10 omitted George. EPA in its risk assessments omits 11 George. European regulators in their risk assessments omit George. We're not saying one 12 13 study has to get you there, but it has to be a 14 study designed to test whether or not Roundup's a carcinogen. And that's not George. George is not 15 16 designed as a carc study. It's not a 17 carcinogenicity study. It cannot prove that 18 Roundup causes cancer and, therefore, it has no 19 probative value. THE COURT: It's overruled. 20 31, 21 Seralini study. S-e-r-a-l-i-n-i. 2.2 MR. HASKEN: Yes, Your Honor. Tim 23 Hasken for defendant Monsanto. Seralini study has 24 been excluded by every court that has considered 25 this motion. And the reason is because it's

uniformly rejected as unreliable science. 1 The 2 peer review journal that it initially got 3 published in depublished the study. It was so 4 flawed that the journal had to pull it down. It 5 then got republished in a non-peer review journal 6 a couple years later. But the study simply has 7 none of the methodological requirements needed to be reliable. That's the reason why IARC doesn't 8 9 consider it, EPA doesn't consider it. No 10 regulator considers it. Not a reliable scientific article. It was depublished from a peer review 11 12 journal. It has no bearing in this case. The 13 jury shouldn't be subjected to science that isn't 14 peer reviewed and that the weight of scientific 15 bodies reject. And that's the sixth or seventh 16 other trial judges who've heard this motion before 17 have excluded it. 18 MR. WOOL: Your Honor, this a little bit 19 of a red herring. So the exclusive basis that we would want to admit the Seralini study is to show 20 21 that it is feasible to test formulated Roundup. 2.2 To do a carcinogenicity study with formulated 23 Roundup. You heard last year -- last week, I'm 24 sorry -- I believe it was from Mr. Hasken, I

apologize, but that it was impossible to do a

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1	long-term feeding study with a formulated
2	glyphosate-based herbicide. The Seralini study
3	shows that that is not true.
4	Now, whatever criticisms of the study on
5	a scientific basis that there are, none of them go
6	to the idea and nobody really disputes that the
7	mice were fed and that they ate formulated
8	glyphosate-based herbicides. And so that's why we
9	want to introduce the study, to show that this is
10	feasible.
11	Now, as to the point that other trial
12	judges excluded the study, I think that's a little
13	bit misleading. I think I'm the only one here
14	who was involved in the Hardeman trial. And in
15	the Hardeman trial, what Judge Chhabria did, for
16	example, was exclude the study as probative of the
17	fact that Roundup can cause cancer. We did not
18	try to introduce the study in that trial for the
19	purpose that we would introduce it here, which is
20	only to show that you can feed mice formulated
21	glyphosate-based herbicides and they will eat it.
22	And so, you know, this goes directly to
23	one of Monsanto's defenses, which is, well, it
24	would have been impossible for us to do this study
25	that plaintiffs are asking. And so all we are

trying to do with the study is say, Look, one person has tried to do this. You can criticize any aspect of the study that you want, but there's nobody out there who's actually saying that those mice didn't eat the formulated herbicides.

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THE COURT: And how would you expect to get it in? I mean, if the -- in what context, with what witness and what -- and to what degree would the study be referenced? In other words, its findings, the foundation for it, the -- you know, the process of how it was performed, what?

MR. WOOL: So as far as the specific 12 13 witness, I would have to go back to the testimony, 14 Your Honor, so I apologize for that. But what we 15 would effectively show is, hey, Monsanto's aware 16 of this study, the -- Monsanto's aware that the 17 mice in the study were fed formulated product. And either get Monsanto to admit or point out that 18 19 there's no relevant criticism out there that the 20 mice didn't actually eat the herbicide. You know, 21 that the criticism of the study that Monsanto has 22 made in the public and the reasons why it was retracted don't go to the -- what we think is the 23 24 essential question of whether or not you can do a 25 carcinogenicity study with a formulated product.

And if the testimony's not there, I'm 1 going to be taking a 30(b)6 witness in I think 2 about a week and a half, two weeks or something 3 like that. And so, you know, if there's no other 4 5 testimony, we could have a very short designation 6 if it simply goes to Monsanto's awareness of the 7 study's methodology and whether or not there's any credible evidence whatsoever that the animals in 8 that study did not actually eat formulated 9 10 glyphosate herbicides. 11 MR. HASKEN: Your Honor, putting this study that's been universally rejected as 12 13 unreliable, as evidence that Monsanto could have 14 done a 18-month to 24-month mouse-feeding study 15 that complies with scientifically acceptable 16 standards makes no sense. This study isn't 17 scientifically acceptable. There's no showing, there's no evidence that however they can -- fed 18 19 these mice is in any way something that would pass muster with scientific agencies, with regulatory 20 21 agencies reviewing the study. It is a rejected 22 study, it has no probative value. And having it come in for this side door purpose when it is a 23 24 rejected study, it doesn't have evidence that it's 25 methodologically sound. It should be excluded.

1	It's misleading to the jury.
2	MR. WOOL: If I can make just one
3	additional point, Your Honor. As for reasons why
4	it's been rejected on a scientific basis, the
5	reasons are things like there weren't enough mice,
6	that sort of thing. That, you know, not something
7	that it goes to the question of feasibility of
8	this particular type of study that and you
9	heard it last week, Monsanto intends to argue to
10	the jury it was impossible to do this study. They
11	never tried, the person that did it was able to
12	get the animals to eat the formulated herbicides.
13	THE COURT: Well, I guess I'd need to
14	conceptualize how this is going to be presented to
15	a jury. Would you propose that if a Monsanto
16	witness were to be asked a question, Sir, isn't it
17	true that you can perform studies on lab animals,
18	whatever way whatever where they are fed
19	formulated Roundup? Nope, we can't do that.
20	Well, it was done in Seralini's, right? Yeah,
21	that was done, but it was a discarded study, so we
22	don't we still don't think we can do it. Is
23	that how it comes in?
24	MR. WOOL: That could be you know, I
25	think that that's probably the best way. And, you

know, again, Your Honor kind of stopped one step 1 short of where we would want to go, which is 2 3 that's -- you know, the study may have been 4 discarded, but it wasn't discarded because of any 5 questions about whether the animals would eat the 6 product. 7 THE COURT: Right. Presumably. MR. WOOL: Right. 8 THE COURT: All right. So several --9 10 there's lot of documents in this. I'm taking it 11 under advisement, I want to read those documents, you know, now that I, in a better way, have an 12 understanding of what the limited use of it would 13 14 be by the plaintiff, okay? All right. Any other 15 motions in limine we're going to hear this 16 morning? 17 MR. BLAIR: That's all I had on my list, 18 Judge. 19 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, who was 20 that? 21 MR. BLAIR: I'm sorry, that was Wylie 2.2 Blair. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So let's take up next 24 the motion for defendant Monsanto to identify all 25 local contractors in the juror questionnaire.

MR. BLAIR: Sure, Judge. Wylie Blair 1 for the plaintiffs. The basis for this motion is 2 3 that Monsanto/Bayer has a very heavy presence in 4 the Kansas City area. Just looking at their 5 website, they have a 240-acre facility where they 6 manufacture and some 550 crop science employees 7 The manufacturing includes producing top there. selling seed treatments, herbicides, fungicides 8 9 and insecticides, et cetera. So the types of 10 product that we're talking about here. 11 To that end, given the nature of their 12 best presence in Jackson County to where potential 13 jurors may be contractors of Monsanto, we need to 14 know who their contractors are that they use for 15 whatever is outsourced within those operations. 16 For instance, if you've got an owner of a company 17 who's sitting there in the veneer, who makes 90 18 percent of his income off of a subcontract with 19 Bayer/Monsanto, that's a pretty significant conflict that needs to be fleshed out. But we 20 21 have no way of knowing who those contractors are, 2.2 whereas the defense obviously does and can easily produce that information. And that's a type of 23 24 thing that we need to know going into voir dire. 25 THE COURT: Defense.

1	MS. SASTRE: Rob, are you handling this?
2	MR. ADAMS: Yeah. I'll go ahead and
3	handle this, Your Honor. There's no basis for
4	this, Your Honor. We put in our papers the
5	reasons why this inquiry shouldn't go in to. I'll
6	tell you from my personal experience, this has
7	been you know, in a Ford case where we've got a
8	Claycomo plant, you know, within 15 miles of here,
9	there's never been an inquiry going into are you a
10	contractor or do you work for Ford in a
11	contractual capacity. The jury questionnaire is
12	going to ask about people's dealings with
13	Monsanto. So it will likely come through if a
14	person even knows that they've had any dealings
15	with Monsanto. But to require their sole
16	reason for doing this is to try to argue that
17	Monsanto has multiconnections to the community.
18	That is not appropriate.
19	A juror, if the juror feels that they
20	have some type of dealings with Monsanto that
21	could affect their ability to be biased, that's
22	going to come up through one of the other
23	questions. There is simply no basis for a jury
24	questionnaire to go into a long litany of, you
25	know, do you work for a company that has ever

contracted with Monsanto. That's not done in -and then you can look at the Newton Nolte case where it was not done with respect to a number of different companies that actually do contractual work for Ford Motor Company. I can give you a lot of other examples of it. But it's simply not an appropriate inquiry for a jury questionnaire.

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If anything, they can ask the question, Are you aware of any relationship that you or your employer may have with Monsanto that would affect your ability to be fair here. That's it. I mean, it wouldn't -- they shouldn't be allowed to force into a questionnaire a long litany of questions and have us identify a long list of potential contractors for them to then create the impression that we're somehow saturated within the community. It's not fair, it's not appropriate.

MR. BLAIR: Judge, Wylie Blair. 18 My 19 short response will be that just because something wasn't done in the Ford case or another case, 20 21 doesn't mean that it's not appropriate here. And 22 they can easily provide this information, it's not going to be overly difficult or cumbersome for 23 24 them to identify who their contractors are. And, 25 you know, we don't want to end up with someone

that slips through and gets on a panel who, like I 1 said, has a significant conflict that, you know, 2 3 we were unaware of. And this has happened in 4 prior cases that I've been involved in. 5 To include the last talc trial that we tried, whereas, you know, we had a -- someone with 6 7 a contract with J. and J. who ended up being the foreperson on our last jury. So it's a real 8 9 concern. And we're not trying to, you know, get 10 into the -- try and make some argument or inference that it's the level of the presence of 11 the -- of Bayer in Kansas City, rather we're just 12 13 trying to identify, you know, who has conflicts 14 and what those conflicts are so that we can root 15 that out in voir dire. 16 MR. ADAMS: Again, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Let me ask, Mr. Adams, let 18 me ask a question. Mr. Blair, is it possible -- I 19 mean, let us -- I think you have a right to 20 inquire of a panel as to whether or not any juror 21 is or works for a contractor who is associated 22 with Bayer/Monsanto. I would presume we're going to use the word "Bayer" here on the questionnaire 23 24 and it's going to be used during voir dire, 25 because, you know, Bayer now has taken ownership

of Monsanto, right? 1 2 MR. BLAIR: Yeah. 3 And so why -- I understand THE COURT: 4 that you may not know who all the contractors are, 5 but obviously that can be an area of inquiry and 6 jurors can answer in the positive. 7 MR. BLAIR: Well, we're not asking for 8 every contractor that Bayer has nationwide, we're 9 just asking for those that they use locally in 10 Jackson County, where there may be a decent 11 likelihood that we would draw someone who is a contractor for or works for a contractor for 12 Bayer. And I think that Mr. Frazer had that come 13 14 up in his last Cerro Copper case over in St. Clair 15 County, where they had an I.T. person who was a 16 contractor for Cerro copper. So I don't think 17 it's burdensome and I think it's just easier for 18 them to identify who the contractors are so we can 19 easily make further inquiry if we indeed do see people in the voir dire who check the box saying I 20 work for this contractor. 21 2.2 MR. ADAMS: Yeah. And again, Your 23 Honor, I mean, I'm happy to provide you juror 24 questionnaires that have been used in Jackson County before. I don't know about Mr. Frazer's 25

experience in some other county, but that's never 1 been required, because, really, the inquiry is 2 3 whether the individual knows of any kind of 4 relationship that would make them be impartial to 5 Bayer or Monsanto. We shouldn't be required to 6 list, you know, to perform a search and list all 7 these contractors, because, really, the inquiry is whether the juror knows of it. A lot of jurors 8 9 won't even know of it if there was such a 10 relationship. And if they don't know of it, then how can they be partial to the defendants? So 11 there's no basis for this. 12 MR. BLAIR: Well, I guess, finally, 13 Ι 14 mean, what's the harm in it? 15 MR. ADAMS: Well, the harm is, is that 16 we shouldn't be required to do that. We wouldn't 17 ask the court to, you know, if the other side was a commercial side, a commercial company as opposed 18 19 to an individual plaintiff, I don't think it would be fair inquiry for us to say okay, list out every 20 21 single person in this questionnaire who your 2.2 company has ever done business with, and we're going to ask the panel whether they work for or 23 24 have any connection to those companies. 25 THE COURT: I'm denying the motion. And

by the denial, it does not mean in any respect 1 that is going to -- that you're going to be 2 3 limited on voir dire on the subject of who's --4 you know, who works for someone that's associated 5 with Monsanto or Bayer. It's just as a part of 6 the questionnaire identifying all those 7 contractors, I'm not going to oblige the defendant to do that. 8 9 That does seque into the rest of the 10 questionnaire. I want to tell you what I've done. 11 I've just -- I've attempted to formulate a question that would address hardship and who has 12 13 an undue hardship if they were obliged to sit on 14 the jury. And I have concluded by operation of 15 pen to paper, that a question of that nature is 16 very difficult to formulate that can get the point 17 across that I could do by just asking the question in a way I think appropriate, and then being 18 19 allowed to dialogue with those jurors who may have an issue to determine the basis for it. 20 21 In other words, we ask a question --2.2 what you can expect my question to be, and it's off the top of my head at this very moment, but 23 24 what it is in every case is, Ladies and Gentlemen 25 of the Jury, I've inquired of the attorneys, they

have advised me that this case will last no less than three weeks and most likely into a fourth week. Our schedule is 8:00 to 5:00. You are customarily going to be asked to be here by 8:00 or by 8:30 so that we can start court punctually. You can expect that at the conclusion of the day, those days will end at 5:00, unless we end at just a few minutes after that to allow a witness's testimony to be concluded. The only exception to that is during deliberation, if you were to request to stay -- or you would stay with us past 5:00, if that's what you wanted to do during deliberation, but you can certainly break during deliberation, if I deem appropriate, and stay past 5:00.

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16 Now, with all that information in front 17 of you, this is also a case where the following 18 dates would be excluded as being available to the 19 Court. May 9, I've already checked on that, my staff is not available. May 19, May 20 and May 20 21 27. Okay. My question to those on the panel. Is 2.2 there anyone here who finds that service on this jury for that time frame would be an undue 23 24 hardship, a hardship greater than that that would be experienced by your fellow jurors, your 25

neighbors as you sit here today, if you were to be required to be a juror on this case for a case that would last three weeks and into a fourth.

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maker.

4 The hands go up, that's the end of the 5 question. The hands go up, I then take the burden 6 on of addressing those jurors and pressing them on 7 the subject, rather than obliging the lawyers to do it. Doesn't mean you couldn't do it, it would 8 9 just allow me to press it. There are those 10 people, let's say -- and I'll just pull a 11 corporation out of the blue -- sir, I work for Ford, if I'm missing four weeks from work, I can't 12 13 possibly hold on to my job, I -- you know, et 14 cetera. Sir, are you aware that Ford actually has 15 a benefit that's available to you that relates to 16 jury service and they will accommodate you and 17 allow you to be off and also pay you while you're 18 on jury duty? I think that's true with Ford, I 19 can't say for sure. But it's certainly true of 20 governmental agencies, you know, or schools or 21 whatever, you know. So I get into that, okay. 2.2 Then I hear I'm a sole proprietor, if I'm not there, my shop's not open. I'm a clock 23

> If I'm out of work for four weeks as a clock maker, I will not be able to keep my store

open or pay my bills, you know, those kind of things. So there's all kinds of hardship issues that if I put it on paper, I think would just lengthen the process of jury selection, not shorten it. Because every juror would have to be confronted with that which you're addressing. You have another juror. You know, I have recently been diagnosed with a very serious illness, I have an appointment with -- my first appointment with my doctor is next Tuesday. I've waited two months to get in and I have to make that appointment. Right? Those kind of things. So that's why I'm concerned about putting a hardship question into the questionnaire. I think we could put something in there, we -- I'm not privy to all the questionnaires that have been used in the past. The only one I am privvy to, I don't know if I can present it to you, because I don't know if it's a court document. But certainly I have been conversing with Judge

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20 certainly I have been conversing with Judge
21 Torrence, he is trying a case where a
22 questionnaire is being used on a criminal case
23 involving an attorney who was shot and killed a
24 couple of years ago in the Brookside neighborhood
25 area and the trial relates to the person who is

charged with that. It was a very note -- it was a 1 case with a lot of media attention and for which 2 there's a lot of complexity. 3 4 Be that as it may. They're using a 5 questionnaire, so I've been privy to that one. 6 But I don't have any others. And I will not 7 betray anything other than the truth, I have not used a questionnaire in jury selection before. So 8 9 that's where I'm at. Let's open the floor. Where are we? 10 11 MR. BLAIR: Judge, I think that's fine from plaintiff's perspective. I think, really, 12 13 it's a matter of, you know, inquiring and checking 14 boxes on whether they meet the criteria under the 15 statute for a hardship. So I think that the oral 16 approach is indeed best. 17 MR. ADAMS: And, Your Honor, we had --18 this is Robert Adams for Amy -- we had submitted 19 -- Anthony Martinez submitted a version of that question for the Court's consideration. 20 The good 21 news is, is that the way you are articulated it is 2.2 pretty close to the way we suggested that you ask 23 the question. So I think that's fine. And then 24 the bigger issue is dealing with the details of 25 the questionnaire that we have provided to the

plaintiffs and their comments on that. I don't know if you want to segue into that issue or not. But with respect to the hardship question, I think that's fine. And you can look at our email for the suggestion to see if you want to alter it. But again, I think the way you articulated it was pretty close to the way we suggested.

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THE COURT: Let me -- so let's be clear 8 9 on how we're going to approach this. What my 10 expectation is, is that the panel will come in and will be addressed initially in three different 11 sections. And they're going to be given 12 13 essentially two hours apiece. I think we start at 14 9:00, 11:00 and 2:00. I think that's how we are 15 doing it. I'm going to have to check the times. 16 But we're going to get them all in, we're going to 17 present them each with a questionnaire, we're going to get the questionnaires answered. 18

But what I'm anticipating that I do is to qualify them upon arrival. And what we customarily do, at least in Jackson County, and I -- this is the only place I've been a judge, so it's the only place I know where we qualify people the way we do. And if everybody says yeah, that's how they do it everywhere else.... By

qualification, that means to me are they qualified 1 to serve as a juror legally under our statute. 2 3 And if the statute is well known to you, then 4 excuse me while I reference it for those who may 5 not have it available to them. 6 Anyway. There is a criteria for who's 7 qualified. And I'm going to inquire of them on that subject. And I would anticipate there being 8 9 some element of that that would relate that this 10 is a -- you know, probably not with any specifics, 11 but this will be a lengthier trial. And that often, that qualification period, again, it's not 12 13 on the record, just allows me to go through the 14 criteria that the statute outlines of who is and 15 who isn't available or eligible. Because we'll 16 have those who've moved out of Jackson County 17 since the summons was issued. We'll have those 18 who have medical conditions for which our jury 19 supervisor after an examination of the individual's basis for being excused, are then 20 allowed to be excused. 21 22 There's those who do approach us at the 23 qualification time with a concern that allows them 24 a deferment, which means we put them back on in 25 six months. Those kind of things. So I'm not
going to go into the hardship question and 1 qualification, I'm just going to inquire of those 2 3 who come to me and indicate an issue regarding 4 their qualification. And there's a catch-all 5 element of the statute that relates to something a 6 little less particular than where you live, 7 whether you got a felony conviction and those kind of things. And it deals with medical and other 8 9 issues, something like that. 10 So long story short, I would presume 11 that there will be those who come in to answer the questionnaire that we'll address on gualifications 12 13 before they ever answer the questionnaire for whom 14 an excuse may be allowed. Okay. Nothing new 15 about that in Jackson County, I would presume 16 everybody does it that way, but that's just a 17 presumption. So then I intend to give them the 18 questionnaire, allow them to answer the 19 questionaire. I don't intend to have the lawyers 20 in the room with me when we're doing all this. 21 Then I would presume that we'll get the 2.2 questionnaires to you on the 28th. And then my 23 proposition would be, can we address this on the 24 29th and -- on the record and give us all one day 25 to work with our questionnaires and review those

1	and then materially take up those to whom an issue
2	is presented to determine if they should or should
3	not be, you know, excused on whatever basis is the
4	rationale for them to be excused or stricken?
5	Such as, I know Allan Shelton, such as, you know,
6	I am an employee of Bayer. Such as whatever, you
7	know, I've been a patient of Dr. McGuirk or
8	whoever is the, you know or things like that,
9	you know, whatever that may be.
10	MR. BLAIR: Wylie Blair for the
11	plaintiffs. I think that that approach is just
12	fine.
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	MR. ADAMS: And, Your Honor, Robert
15	Adams for Monsanto. We agree. I think and we
16	can deal with the details on how we get the
17	questionnaires to the parties. But assuming we
18	get the questionnaires to the parties on the 28th
19	with enough time for us to review it, I think it
20	then makes sense for us to meet with the Court on
21	the 29th and cover issues like you just raised.
22	THE COURT: I'm going to be in a
23	position where I Amy has obligations as one of
24	the officers of the Court Reporters Association
25	here in Missouri on the 29th. I'll address that

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1	personally. If that becomes problematic, I'll let
2	you know. And so, yeah, again, I'm going to seek
3	your valuable insight on these issues as attorneys
4	who have addressed cases of this nature on this
5	process, and ask you all you know, there's a
6	spirit of cooperation that I expect on issues like
7	this that aren't related to the adversarial nature
8	of the proceedings, but more on the logistical
9	aspect as officers of the court, where we're
10	attempting to eliminate the necessity of, you
11	know, undue delay and difficulty for citizens
12	getting summoned to jury duty, right? So
13	hopefully on that end we are able to address that.
14	What I'm going to be doing here in a
15	couple minutes you're probably noticing I have
16	individuals joining us now for my 11:00. So you
17	may be sitting through the 11:00 so we can keep
18	going, or you can take a break and I can tell you
19	that I'll be back at 11:15, whatever you want to
20	do. That's not yet, though. Okay.
21	Let's talk about the questionnaire then.
22	Materially where are we on that?
23	MR. ADAMS: Materially where we are at,
24	is we have revised the questionnaire and submitted
25	it to the other side. And they have some issues

1	with respect to the content of the questionnaire.
2	We can talk about that now. I think they're
3	pretty simple issues that we could resolve and I
4	think that would make sense to do it so we can get
5	a final version to the Court pursuant to when you
6	wanted it. Which I think was the I thought
7	April 13th, but I may be wrong.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Blair, are you going to
9	comment on this or is someone else?
10	MR. BLAIR: I think that Shawn Foster
11	will be handling.
12	THE COURT: Mr. Foster. You're on mute,
13	sir.
14	MR. FOSTER: Can you hear me now, Judge?
15	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
16	MR. FOSTER: So Judge, we basically have
17	four issues I think we can talk about. And that
18	is, you know, obviously the purpose of the
19	questionnaire is to get basic demographic
20	information and obvious conflicts. And when you
21	look at what we got a ten-page questionnaire
22	from the other side that I think with almost every
23	question, it has please explain, give your
24	opinions. And just going through the college
25	process with my daughter, I could see that

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questionnaire taking five days to fill out. 1 And so, you know, I want to stick to 2 kind of the higher points, but I can delve down 3 4 into the details. But the one thing that they're 5 doing is, it's voluminous, but it's also asking 6 the jurors to pledge the credibility to certain 7 witnesses and documents. It's asking for them to pledge their credibility for the reputation of the 8 product, the safety of the product. They do that 9 10 by asking, Do you believe Roundup's a good product? Do you believe it's a safe product? 11 They ask what we -- the old question, 12 13 the widow versus the corporation or the deceased 14 family versus the corporation questions. And that 15 issue's been discussed since the 1800s in 16 Missouri, that you're always going to get somebody 17 that is going to say, well, obviously I'm going to feel for the widow. But that doesn't mean they're 18 19 not -- you got to go to the further questions to see if they're biased or if they could be fair. 20 21 I think the questionnaire as it stands 2.2 now, Judge, would be -- would probably add days to the trial. It's not going to -- you know, the 23 24 whole reason for the questionnaire is to 25 streamline the process. But if you get these

questions, all it's going to do is have the plaintiffs have to immediately start, you know, trying to ask the people and ask certain questions on there, they're going to have to go to each witness and try to rehabilitate them right from the beginning.

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7 Where I think all those questions -- I'm all for a long voir dire. I think that it should 8 9 be able to speak the truth. But when you're 10 asking the witnesses to pledge their credibility 11 to a product or its safeness, I think they're afraid to talk after they write all that down in 12 these forms. And when you see their form, it 13 14 truly will explain why. One of the question is --15 they're not even about the potential juror, it's 16 about people you know. Close friends. Has a 17 close friend had cancer? Why do you think that 18 they got cancer? That could take somebody three 19 pages to fill out. And why that's relevant, I don't know. 20

I mean, you can ask these questions, I think they can all be reworded. I'm all about having a wide-open voir dire. But I think it's better to be done during voir dire. I think this questionnaire is way out there. We had this issue

come up with -- in front of Judge Burleson in the 1 ADM case with the Sunshine law firm. And what 2 3 Burleson did, which I think is the best way to 4 handle it, is to say hey, you have no right to use 5 a questionnaire, I'm doing -- I'm allowing you 6 guys to do it to the benefit of both sides. If 7 you can't agree on a question, then don't send it to me. You have to be able to agree on every 8 9 question or don't send it to me, I just won't use 10 the questionnaire. That's the one way we could do 11 it. The other way we could do it, which I 12 13 don't think it's a good use of the Court's time, 14 is we can do converse questions to their questions 15 and make them just as inflammatory as their 16 questions about, Do think a big company should be 17 able to take advantage of little people? Do you 18 have a feeling about that? That's just a waste of 19 the Court's time. So I think before we spend a lot of time 20 21 on this, I think it should be that we get with 2.2 Rob, and if we can agree on the questions during 23 the questionnaire, if both sides can't agree on 24 it, then the question's not in the questionnaire. 25 It gives room to compromise, if they got a

question they really want in there that we don't think should be, and vice versa. But I think that's the best way to try to get this wrapped up sooner than later.

5 MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, I'll respond if 6 I may. I think when you see the actual 7 questionnaire, there are no inflammatory 8 questions. We have asked questions patterned off 9 of the questionnaire that was approved by Judge 10 Atwell in the Newton Nolte case, and also the 11 questionnaire that was approved by Judge Scheiber in the Scheer versus Boston Scientific and Bard 12 13 case. None of those questions are in any way 14 inflammatory or asking for unusual explanations. 15 Again, it goes to the heart of the matter why you use a questionnaire in a case like this. 16 It's 17 going to be a long, complicated process. And to 18 say that, well, these questions aren't appropriate 19 and, therefore, we should abandon the questionnaire is not right. That's not what 20 21 judges have done in Jackson County before. 2.2 What we have asked plaintiffs several 23 times is, is that tell us what your issues are 24

with the questionnaire. And in our most recent meet and confer with them, they identified two

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areas. One, they identified question No. 17 that had to do with prior jury service, saying that that is not appropriate and shouldn't be inquired into. And then they raised an issue about question No. 18, juror litigation experience. Those questions are commonly asked on questionnaires, but I bring those up because they're not bringing forth good faith criticisms of the questionnaire. They simply do not want to use it.

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11 That goes back to the whole reason why 12 courts have allowed questionnaires in complicated cases like this. We should not have to spend a 13 14 significant amount of time in voir dire, going 15 into issues that, frankly, jurors are going to be 16 -- they're going to be more efficient in 17 responding to these questions when lawyers are not 18 present and when they can just sit down in the 19 allotted time that the Court has given to them. 20 And you're going to see that this questionnaire 21 that we have actually has fewer questions than the 2.2 questionnaire that Judge Atwell used in the Nolte 23 trial or that Judge Scheiber used in the Scheer 24 trial.

Now, I'm happy to, you know, sit down

with Mr. Foster or people from our team can sit down with them, but they have to engage in a good faith process of going through individual questions and telling us what the problem is that they have with it. And then I suggest if we need to bring particular questions to the Court's attention, we can do that. And you can decide, you know, is this somehow inflammatory. I don't think that any of these questions, they are simply asking for information. Like such as, do you know of anyone who has cancer? Do you know of the reason? There's nothing wrong with that, you could do that in open court. But the reason why we don't want to do it in open court, is because if you have a venire panel the size of what we have, it's going to take a week. And that again, I'm kind of repeating myself, but it goes back to why we have the questionnaire. So we can, again, engage in this process, but they have to use good faith.

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The last time we talked with them, they identified these two questions. The questions are commonly asked, and so there's no basis for those. If they want to raise other ones, that's fine, too, but we need some finality on it. And we need

-- if -- and they have our guestionnaire. And so 1 2 if they have particular issues, we're fine to work 3 with them on crafting the question differently. 4 But to simply say oh, we don't think it's useful 5 or we don't think it's appropriate, is not good 6 faith. 7 MR. FOSTER: And Judge, if I could just --8 9 THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Foster, can I 10 -- I allowed Mr. Adams to complete his thoughts without interrupting him. I will return to this 11 12 case in a few minutes. I'd encourage you to stay 13 with me, because this hearing that I'm about ready 14 to hold is going to be hopefully short. If I find 15 it's otherwise, then I will -- I will let you know 16 that we're going to take a break. But, otherwise, 17 I'd ask you to stay with me and we'll then return to the record on your case. 18 19 (Recess.) THE COURT: We'll return to the record 20 21 in Shelton versus Monsanto. And we're prepared to 22 hear from Mr. Foster on the subject of the 23 questionnaire. Go ahead, sir. 24 MR. FOSTER: Judge, just in response, I 25 want to be clear. We agree that there should be a

questionnaire, we have no problem with the questionnaire. I just think it should be used appropriately and not turn this into -- obviously jury consultants have written these, I understand why they want to know if somebody's been in the military. Because they want a rule follower. All these questions have been fine. And I'm telling you, these questions that are asked are all to pledge credibility towards the product, toward the witnesses. Whether it be the EPA, we all have seen the jurors. Most of them are going to start having issues just by fatigue. When you have 50 or 60 questions and you have to explain or give your opinions to, everyone -- they are just going to stop. And then in voir dire, those questions are still going to be asked. I mean, I don't think anybody -- some of these questions, Judge, how worried are you that your

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family member is going to get cancer? Is Roundup a good product? Is Roundup a safe product? Have you ever been mistreated by a corporation? Have you or a close member had cancer? What were your thoughts?

Are they like going to ask everyone in voir dire, does anybody here believe that Roundup

is a safe product? Are they not going to ask -and then when they say -- somebody says well, I don't think it's a safe product, explain why. They explain why, I assume the next question is going to be does anybody else in here have those strong opinions? Now somebody raises their hand and says, Yeah, after that, I don't think it's a safe product. And then Mr. Adams gets up and goes, Well, wait a minute. You pledged here on this when you said -- you just said it was a safe product two hours ago. So then that does exactly what you don't want in voir dire. Now everybody's heard that, that silenced everybody. Now nobody is going to raise their hand and say anything different than what they said in that questionnaire.

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17 So I do believe that guestionnaires are 18 good for things like if you want to know where a 19 potential juror's kids went to college. We don't 20 want to spend all day going around asking where 21 your kids went to college. Get that information. 22 If there's -- you know, none of those answers to those questions, Judge, are going to make it to 23 24 where we come to you and ask you to excuse the 25 juror. It's just going to be more to ask those

1	exact same questions the next day.
2	So we know in talc that a two-page
3	questionnaire took an hour. We know their
4	questionnaire without us conversing all of these
5	inflammatory questions, you know, to ask if you
6	already feel sympathy for somebody that has cancer
7	over a big corporation. There's a Missouri case
8	that says if you ask that question about a widow
9	versus a big corporation, 99 percent are going to
10	say they have sympathy for the widow. That
11	doesn't mean they don't get on the jury. So what
12	purpose would that question have? And you know
13	Mr. Adams is going to ask it during voir dire.
14	So we're just saying keep the
15	questionnaire, you know, to very demographic
16	questions, to obviously great conflict questions.
17	But let's not do voir dire in the questionnaire
18	and then come back later, you know, in closing
19	argument and say, Remember when we did voir dire
20	and we asked you questions? We expect you to
21	stick with those questions. Well, then they're
22	going to get confused whether when they said
23	Roundup's good in the questionnaire, it's just the
24	way it's written and the questions asked.
25	All those questions can be asked, I

don't have a problem with it. They should just be 1 asked during voir dire. And they're going to be 2 asked anyways. And they're going to ask somebody, 3 raise your hand if you believe what he just said. 4 5 And then there's going to be conflicts with what they said in their questionnaire and what they 6 7 didn't say and it will just turn into a nightmare. So we're just asking to streamline it. 8 9 We do want a questionnaire, we're for a 10 questionnaire. And I think as we work on it, I think what pushes both sides together is to say 11 hey, the Court's doing you guys a favor allowing 12 13 you to do a questionnaire. And if you can't agree 14 on the questions, they're not going to come in. 15 And then it forces compromises and it gets a lot 16 shorter of a questionnaire. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Obviously I'm dealing 18 with this in a vacuum. I'll hear from you, Mr. 19 Adams, on the subject, I just don't have, you 20 know, the document in front of me to analyze. 21 MR. ADAMS: Yeah, agreed. And, you 22 know, you note that Mr. Foster doesn't identify 23 specific questions that he has problems with. 24 And, you know, the -- it's illogical to say that 25 all of the questions that we ask in the

questionnaire they're fine with and they can be asked in the courtroom. So that's what he just said. And then say well, we don't think the questionnaire is appropriate. Well, the whole idea on the questionnaire is, is that, one, it's not going to take a lot of time. It's down now, I believe we're down to 50 -- let's see. Let me look, Judge.

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9 In our latest iteration that we sent 10 them, 55 questions. The questionnaire that was 11 approved by Judge Atwell and used in that case was 69 questions. I know that Judge Atwell engaged in 12 13 the same procedure that Judge Scheiber did, which 14 is to bring them in like you're proposing, bring 15 the jurors in and they fill it out in less than an 16 hour. This is not a difficult questionnaire. But 17 again, the whole purpose is, is to get information 18 prior to the time that you go into voir dire so 19 you don't have to ask general questions. You can 20 hone in on what was responded to in the 21 questionnaire. And that's why it saves a lot of 2.2 time. 23 I can tell you that the converse -- and

I know you have been involved in cases where voir dire lasts a long time. In the Liberty bus case,

voir dire lasted a week, because we didn't have a 1 questionnaire. It's -- this is a expedited 2 3 procedure, both sides will get more information. 4 If they have problems with specific questions, 5 then send me in the email with it. But to simply say, well, you know, we don't think you should use 6 7 a question that you can ask in the open court 8 anyway, is an appropriate way of dealing with the 9 language in the questionnaire. Because again, it 10 goes back to the purpose of it, which is to 11 streamline the process. If you looked at the Newton Nolte 12 13 questionnaire, it asked jurors how they feel about 14 Ford, do they have problems with Ford vehicles, 15 things like that. That's what we patterned our questionnaire after. Could we ask that in open 16 17 court in voir dire? You betcha. But it would 18 take a lot of time with the venire panel that we 19 have to go through all those responses. So here's my proposal, and I totally 20 21 understand, Your Honor, that you don't have the 2.2 questionnaire in front of you. What I propose is 23 that based upon what we've already sent them, they 24 provide us in the email, either today or Monday, 25 with the specific problems that they have to

specific questions, as opposed to saying we think the questionnaire should just be limited to hardship. That's not appropriate. But give us specific issues that they have on individual questions, we will then respond to that and we can meet and confer. But we need specifics as far as what problems they have.

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8 If, you know, Mr. Foster wants to see 9 questionnaires that have been done in prior cases, 10 like Newton Nolte, I've got them. I can provide 11 them to you. I mean, this process should not be difficult. Newton Nolte was, you know, I was 12 involved for Ford and Grant Davis was on the other 13 14 side. The Scheer case, Tom Cartmell was on the 15 plaintiff's side, I was on the defense side along 16 with Ms. Sastre. We were able to work it out. So 17 this is a true saving of the Court's time and the 18 parties time. So what I would propose, they send 19 us an email with specific issues that they have on 20 individual questions and then we will respond to 21 it. And if we can't agree, we'll give it to the 2.2 Court. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. FOSTER: I agree with that, Judge. 25 MR. ADAMS: You're on mute, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So I don't know 1 2 if you all having a, you know, if not an in-person 3 meeting but a WebEx meeting, you know, to just 4 parse that out, may be a little more of an 5 efficient manner to address that. So what I would 6 propose we do is get me something by the 13th and 7 then if you say Judge, can we have till the 15th, I would think that the 15th would be all right, 8 9 with the idea that we've got to get this 10 addressed. So I have a bench trial, a murder bench trial on Monday, it will last two and a half 11 I then have another murder case the 12 days. 13 following Monday, that's a jury trial. That will 14 last four days or more. And then I obviously 15 won't be trying any cases the week of April 25, 16 because we're picking a jury on the 27th. And so 17 -- at least that's my plan right now. So that's 18 where we stand there. 19 The only exception to that could be that 20 Judge Youngs could step in and handle the 21 questionnaire if I have a very short trial. But 2.2 you're going to need me by Thursday or Friday, 23 whenever we can get to this. Long story shorter, how's the 15th sound? Extend this to the 15th? 24 25 MR. ADAMS: I think the 15th is fine,

Your Honor. What I would propose, though, is to 1 2 cut down on the time and to really hone in what 3 specific issues they have. Just -- Shawn, just 4 send me an email with any questions that, you 5 know, you have a problem with or that you want 6 different language. And if you could do that by 7 noon on Monday the 11th, we'll respond on the 13th 8 or the 12th, and then we can get on a Zoom and 9 figure it out. 10 MR. FOSTER: That works for me. 11 THE COURT: That works for me. Good. So there's been a mention of the use of 12 So yeah. 13 a court reporter for daily transcript that is 14 independent of the Court. I have heard that, I am 15 concerned about that, and I'm going to address 16 that issue with my reporter, Amy McCombs, so we 17 can determine how we're going to go with that. 18 And so I will put you on notice now, I've never 19 had that in court. I have some serious concerns about it, one of which is a jury seeing someone 20 21 transcribing the events for which isn't Amy and 22 what's that mean and do we get that and all those 23 kind of things. So I've got some concerns there 24 as to that. And I understand that there might be 25 a request for daily copy. So Amy and I are going

to be consulting on that, as well as a 1 determination on a circuit-wide level whether 2 3 that's even appropriate, okay? 4 MR. ADAMS: Understood. THE COURT: As it relates to an 5 6 instruction, the, you know, the instruction committee with the latest edition of the book has 7 8 given us direction and encouragement to present to 9 the jury an instruction that more materially 10 addresses issues for which your -- the case 11 involves. I would encourage the attorneys to draw an inclusion that you can create such an 12 instruction that is fair. It's not argumentative 13 14 and it's not taking sides in any way, but just 15 flushing out what are the issues. If you're not 16 able to and we go to the fallback position, then 17 we would use the one that we have been using and I 18 -- that is just a generic version of what we're 19 doing in voir dire. I'd also, though it may not be 20 21 necessary, I would order that the plaintiffs will 2.2 present to the Court the standard instructions that we'll be using, including 2.01. And remember 23 24 that 2.03 is the new implicit bias instruction 25 that is required both prior to jury selection and

is required to be read during the course of the 1 instructions after closings. I would then tell 2 you that without any doubt I'd let jurors take 3 4 notes. Jurors have the option of being allowed to 5 ask questions and I'd open the floor to that 6 discussion on how you want to handle that. 7 MR. ADAMS: I don't know if you want to hear from me or you want to hear from Mr. Foster 8 9 first. 10 THE COURT: It doesn't matter to me. 11 You all can tell me what you think about jurors asking questions. 12 13 MR. ADAMS: Yeah, as far as jurors asking questions, I've got mixed feelings about 14 15 it, Your Honor. I think in some cases it's 16 informative, it just depends upon the jury. 17 Because other cases, it really lengthens the 18 So I'm open to suggestions from Mr. Foster trial. 19 and his team. My personal view is, in a case that is going to last this long, it's really probably 20 21 not worth it, because it's just going to -- we're 2.2 going to have to deal with at the end of each 23 witness that's called, there will be questions, 24 the Court will have to consider whether, you know, 25 the parties should respond to the questions,

whether the question's good or bad, things of that 1 2 nature. 3 Overall, I have found that you -- it's 4 typically not worth the time and energy that the 5 Court and the lawyers have to spend on the issue. 6 Although there's limited circumstances when I 7 think it's pretty helpful. But overall, my view would be that we not have questions. 8 9 MR. FOSTER: I would agree with Mr. 10 Adams. 11 THE COURT: So include in the instruction the option of jurors being allowed to 12 take notes and do not include jurors asking 13 14 questions. 15 MR. ADAMS: That's fine. Back to what 16 you suggested as far as the early case summary 17 which is E-1.01. I think that's a good idea for 18 this case. And I do think it should be 19 noninflammatory. I do think we should provide more than just a basic example, because it's 20 21 helpful to the jury. So I am fine in us -- it 2.2 doesn't matter to me, Shawn. Do you want to send 23 a brief statement of the case to us and then we 24 revise it or vice versa? Whatever way you prefer. 25 MR. BLAIR: This is Wylie Blair. We've

dealt with putting this together before with the Shook firm in the talc cases that we've tried. Haven't had any problem putting together something that is neutral or -- and agreeable. So I'll -you know, I'll take the liberty of sending something over to you guys, basically just patterned after what was agreed to before that's neutral.

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9 MR. ADAMS: That sounds good. And what 10 I would propose on these dates, Your Honor, is 11 that plaintiffs by Monday at noon, so the 11th on noon, you provide us, you know, Wylie, the draft 12 13 of the early case summary and then also provide us 14 specific objections or requests to revise the 15 statements in our questionnaire. And I think we 16 can turn it around and provide you our responses 17 on the 12th at 3:00 o'clock, and then on the 13th, 18 let's get together and hash out the issues on the 19 questionnaire. And then if we can't agree, we'll submit it to the Court. And Judge, either you or 20 21 Judge Youngs can deal with it. Does that sound 2.2 agreeable? 23 THE COURT: Sounds good to me. 24 MR. BLAIR: Yeah, I think that's --25 That's fine with me. Wylie Blair.

THE COURT: So another issue that I think we have to confront is time limits on voir I'm not talking about 15 minutes. dire. I'm talking about a few hours, all right. We have to realize that -- it's my expectation that we bring in a number of jurors somewhere between 50 and 65. And now that I've got Division 1, now I can manage that a little differently. And I'm going to do it in a reasonable way that won't necessarily allow for the distancing that the third floor would allow for where there's every other chair, but some opportunity for -- to expand that, but also to allow our court reporter be able to hear everybody, okay. You go to the back of that room and have people shouting back there, that's a problem. So we'll manage that. But if we're bringing one panel in on the 2nd and then if it becomes necessary for a panel on the 3rd, then I think we're falling into a situation where we need to just address how much

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panel on the 3rd, then I think we're falling into a situation where we need to just address how much time each side would have for voir dire. Because I don't want 4:30 to arrive and now counsel for the defendant, let's conduct voir dire. That's kind of a -- that's not an ultimate conclusion for how that's going to be, I'm just talking in a general

1 way because we have to be practical. 2 MR. ADAMS: I agree to the limits, Your 3 And as you said before last week, you Honor. 4 know, the plaintiff's probably have more to cover. 5 So what I was thinking is, is that I don't know what total time would be for each panel. But 6 7 let's say -- let's just pick total time is going to be seven hours or total time is going to be six 8 9 hours. I would say that plaintiffs get a little 10 bit more than we do. 11 And so I guess the first issue is what's 12 the total time that we -- that the lawyers can ask 13 questions and then I think we can figure how to 14 divide that fairly. 15 THE COURT: Who's picking the jury for 16 the plaintiffs, have you all decided yet? 17 MR. ROE FRAZER: I think I drew the 18 short stick, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. So, yeah. 20 What we have to confront is the hardship 21 questions. Now, I would propose I ask them for 2.2 the reasons I stated. I think that avoids any issue or limits any issue that the lawyers have to 23 24 confront by you asking the questions and I deny 25 the hardship excuse. If I'm asking the questions,

they'll -- you know, they're presuming I'm making the decision and then, you know, there you go. And since I have to make it anyway, really I don't -- I ask the questions because I think under the statutes, I have almost exclusive authority to do that without really any obligatory input, though I would certainly allow you to.

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And then what I'd like to do, you know, 8 9 and I'm really dialoguing just for a few more 10 minutes. Think about it, you know. So Mr. Frazer, unless you've picked juries in Jackson 11 County before, let me just tell you how we 12 customarily do it here. And I know it's different 13 14 than other places. I'm not suggesting it's the 15 right way, it's just how we've always done it. We 16 put them into the -- you know, one through 18 go 17 into the jury box. We use the row that has the bar on it and then we put it into the gallery. 18

Customarily I ask hardship questions, I get those answers. I hear from those jurors and then -- as to whom have a hardship. And then we make a determination and then we allow you to ask the rest of the questions, and those folks that are here on -- who have expressed a hardship, then stay with us throughout the conclusion of the voir

dire process. And the reason I do that is to allow you all to ask questions regarding the hardships. Not to exclude you from the process and the inquiry, but just -- and therefore let them stay.

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Now, you know, I would think that if you 6 7 thought -- I would think if you thought. What if we just analyzed the idea of taking a break after 8 the hardship questions, determine if there's those 9 10 that we can just mutually agree have no chance of being on this jury and allowing them to be 11 That way they're not part of this 12 excused. 13 dialogue anymore, their chair is empty and we move 14 forward. That obviously has its problems. And 15 the problem being that others perhaps would also 16 raise their hand, why am I still here but she got 17 to go? That's an issue. Oh, is that get out of here, let me know, answer a question of a similar 18 19 nature and let me get out of here, too.

20 So that's just -- that doesn't have to 21 be decided today. I'm just seeing a panel of 65 22 and telling you that, you know, we have to embrace 23 the idea of some limitation on the hours available 24 for questions and how to address that in the 25 appropriate way. Because usually, Mr. Frazer, and

I'm sure you're aware of this and please don't presume that I don't think you're aware of this, I'm just aiding you with my dialogue on this. We then just let everybody go and you just ask questions in the -- of a general nature to all the jurors and then at the conclusion of that, we let Mr. Adams, you're going to be conducting voir dire, Mr. Adams goes through that. And then I permit some individual questions based upon the answers afforded and perhaps the questionnaire. Then we're done. They step outside or perhaps we advise them, we'll give you a call, let you know when you're starting. And then we determine if we have enough from the first day's panel based after we consider hardships, strikes for cause, and each side getting peremptories, whether we have enough. That's my vision of it and those are just -- I want you to realize, I don't have time to draw conclusions on that. Maybe it's a subject that you all talk about. I'm presuming that you

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all will conduct, you know, personal conversations with each other to, you know, to see if there's a way you can present this on a different date. What do you think of that?

Sorry, go ahead, Roe. 1 2 MR. ROE FRAZER: No, you go ahead. 3 I just had one question in MR. BLAIR: 4 terms of the procedure. Do you anticipate those 5 who raise their hand and want to be heard on a 6 hardship, having that hardship heard in the 7 presence of the other jurors? Because I think that you hit on something, that if it's in the 8 9 presence of the other jurors, that they hear, you 10 know, I -- that got them off, sounds like a good 11 thing for me to say, too. THE COURT: I think it would be the only 12 13 way to do it. I don't know how -- I mean, to call 14 every juror up, go into a side bar dialogue with 15 them at length would be very time consuming. And 16 I don't think we have the time to do that. Nor is 17 it the customary way. I mean, you know. Mr. Frazer, did you have a comment? 18 19 MR. ROE FRAZER: I was just wanting to 20 get clarification on one thing, Your Honor. It 21 sounds to me like the -- I'm perfectly fine with 2.2 you asking any hardship questions first. I've never -- I agree with you, sometimes if I ask them 23 24 or follow up -- I'd actually, if I have any 25 questions, prefer to give them to you for your

consideration and whether to follow up or not. 1 So that's my usual practice. But I'll do whatever 2 3 Your Honor wants. 4 And then secondly, as I understand it, 5 both the plaintiff and the defendant will do a 6 general voir dire, and if somebody raises their 7 hand or indicates they want to answer a question, the specific question will be taken up in the next 8 9 phase of voir dire. Or do I take them up right then? Okay. 10 11 THE COURT: Juror 27, do you have an 12 answer to my question. 13 MR. ROE FRAZER: Good. That's the way 14 I've normally done it, I just wanted to -- I don't 15 think that --16 THE COURT: I've been known to talk too 17 much, it may be more confusing than simple and I'm 18 trying to avoid that. I'll just say it, okay? 19 MR. ROE FRAZER: Sure. THE COURT: Did you have any questions 20 21 or issues there, Mr. Adams? 22 MR. ADAMS: I don't, Your Honor. And I 23 agree with Mr. Frazer, that I'd rather have you 24 ask the hardship questions. 25 THE COURT: Okay. We need to get back

together. There's parts of this that I even wonder what are we making a record on some of this. I wouldn't suggest that it's obligatory, but I'm going to continue to do it.

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So, anyway, the next issue, and I want 5 6 you all to think about it, not answer it today 7 because we've got time to consider it. Is how many alternates you want to keep. What I envision 8 9 is, is that the jury will sit in the jury box 10 exclusively, unless I have jurors that seem to 11 have a problem with doing that. And I tried one -- I attempted to try one this week and I had a 12 juror that had some real material concerns about 13 14 it because of who lived in her house and with 15 being that close to other folks. Because she 16 wanted to first be masked, and had some concerns. 17 They were legitimate. I would never question 18 anyone's concerns. They will be given all the 19 credit that they're afforded, no matter what my 20 personal position is on some of those concerns. 21 Nonetheless, what I envision is and with 2.2 my courtroom, I have -- we're going to try the 23 case in Division 13, not in 1. We're just picking 24 a jury in 1. I've got the 12 chairs for the 25 jurors, plus six more for others, and we could

keep more than two alternates. I would propose 1 2 and encourage us to keep at least four alternates. 3 More, less, you tell me, but at least four. 4 MR. ROE FRAZER: I think four is a fair 5 number, Your Honor. 6 MR. ADAMS: I'm fine with that, too, 7 Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So --8 9 MR. BLAIR: Judge, Wylie Blair. Quick 10 question. Last time that I tried a case in front 11 of, well, in Jackson County, it was in front of Judge Grate a number of years ago. And I don't --12 it may have been the Judge's own policy, but it 13 14 wasn't known to the other jurors who the 15 alternates were prior to them being dismissed at 16 the end of the case. As the Judge, do personally 17 have a practice when it comes to that? 18 THE COURT: That is what I intend. 19 However, to propose that I can consider that to be 20 something that doesn't become apparent when they 21 get, you know, the notebooks and where they're 2.2 seated, what I customarily do to avoid that to the 23 degree I can, is I started -- and if you see me 24 pointing, it's because I'm looking at my jury box. 25 I go from one to seven on the back row, eight

starts the middle row, on through whatever that 1 number is, probably 13. Three more in the front. 2 3 And the reality, the three folks in the front are 4 actually alternates. Only because I just tried to 5 seat everybody in some order. 6 And then the only thing I suppose they 7 could pick up on is the fact that their jury notebook, which is numbered so that we can keep 8 track of them, and they will have numbers at least 9 10 internally so Lindsey knows whose book to put 11 where. We will give them notebooks, okay. MR. BLAIR: Got it. 12 13 MR. ROE FRAZER: That's fine. 14 THE COURT: I don't think it's a big 15 deal anyway. But again, I get it. I don't tell them, though. 16 17 MR. BLAIR: We agree. 18 THE COURT: So it's five after 12:00. 19 I've got some other stuff I've got to deal with. 20 I think we can leave. I'm going to have -- I'm 21 going to be obliged to leave the record so my 22 court reporter can have her lunch. And I will 23 stay on so we can determine when we could get back 24 together. We need -- as time starts crunching, we 25 better -- I'm available even after-hours, as long

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1 CERTIFICATE 2 3 STATE OF MISSOURI) 4) ss 5 COUNTY OF JACKSON) 6 7 I, Amy Lynn McCombs, Certified Court Reporter, 8 certify that I am the official court reporter for Division 13 of the 16th Judicial Jackson County 9 Circuit Court, that on Friday, April 8, 2022, I was 10 11 present via videoconference and reported all of the 12 proceedings in Allan Shelton, Plaintiff, vs. Monsanto, 13 Defendant, Case No. 1816-CV17026. 14 I further certify that the foregoing 107 pages 15 contain a true and accurate reproduction of the proceedings transcribed. 16 17 18 /s/ Amy Lynn McCombs 19 20 AMY LYNN MCCOMBS, CCR #1140 21 2.2 23 24 25